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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
To limit the global temperature increase to well below two degrees 
Celsius above pre-industrial levels, mankind needs to stabilise the 
concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere by the middle 
of this century. That is, industry and agriculture cannot emit more 
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases than will be absorbed. 
This will require a massive shift in our economies. Heating, transport, 
electricity and industry will have to be transitioned to a world without 
fossil fuels. Agriculture and industry will have to find new ways to 
reduce emissions.  
These shifts might be eased by societal and technological shifts, such 
as urbanisation, and digitalisation, but decarbonisation will likely 
remain an uphill battle, with reduced fossil fuel consumption 
translating into lower fossil fuel prices, and hence a continued need 
for incentives to avoid using the remaining fossil resources. 
Consequently, climate policy will play a substantial role in this deep 
transformation. Given the challenge, policies need to be quite 
intrusive. Such intrusive policies will likely have substantial side 
effects, including distributional effects. Depending on (1) the policy 
tool, (2) the sector addressed, (3) the design of the policy, and (4) the 
initial socio-economic conditions in the country, individual climate 
policy measures can have very different distributional effects. To 
combat increasing inequality and improve the political acceptability of 
decarbonisation, these distributive effects need to be addressed. 
Should this not occur, there is a real possibility that decarbonisation 
policies will face a political backlash. 
We focus on the impact of specific climate policies on households 
with different income levels. Policies that make low-income 
households better off, relative to high-income households are called 
progressive. Policies that have the opposite effect are called 
regressive. And policies that equally affect high and low-income 
households are called proportionate. We argue that households with 
lower incomes are affected differently by individual climate polices 
compared to higher-income households because they: 
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1) Face budget constraints that lead them to prefer different 
consumption baskets;  
2) Have higher discount rates/feature borrowing constraints that 
prevent them from procuring more efficient durables; 
3) Have different skill endowments and hence wages; and 
4) Earn less income from capital and land. 
We find that key climate policy tools such as carbon taxes for different 
fuels, certain mandatory standards, subsidies and regulatory tools, 
can be regressive. For other climate polices, such as trade policies, 
public investment and agriculture policies, the effects are less clear. 
And for fuel taxes on aviation, for example, the effect might be 
progressive. As the example of the current feed-in tariff designs and 
the allocation rules in the European Union’s emission trading system 
demonstrate, the detailed policy design matters.  
While climate policies can have adverse distributional effects, non-
action cannot be the answer. Non-action would make everybody 
worse off and would affect low-income households more than high-
income households. There is hence no trade-off between climate and 
equity. The question is how we design climate policies to minimise 
any adverse distributional effects. 
Table 1: Summary of our assessment of the distributional effects 
of climate policies (see sections 2 and 3) 
Climate policy Distributional impact Our confidence 
Carbon pricing on…    
… Road fuel 
Mixed evidence, as low-income 
households are less likely to own cars, 
but those that do spend a larger share 
of their income on fuel 
Medium 
… Electricity 
Regressive, due to low-income 
households spending higher shares of 
their income on electricity and because 
of inelastic demand (eg because of a 
limited financial ability to replace old 
electric appliances with efficient ones) 
Medium 
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… Heating 
Regressive, although the extent to 
which low-income households are 
disproportionately hurt compared to 
electricity taxes is less clear 
Medium 
… Air transport 
Likely progressive, as air transport is 
used above-proportionately by high-
income households  
High 
… Maritime transport 
Might be slightly regressive, as low-
income households spend a higher 
share on imported goods. However, 
less maritime trade might benefit low-
skilled manufacturing labour 
Low 
 
Subsidies on low-
carbon technology 
Can be regressive, as, for instance, 
clean vehicle, building-insulation and 
rooftop-solar subsidies mainly go to 
high-income households 
High 
Public investment in 
low-carbon technology 
or complementary 
infrastructure 
Mixed evidence, as it depends on 
whether it increases demand for capital 
or low-skilled labour, and whether it is 
mainly used by low-income households 
(eg city buses) or high-income 
households (eg high-speed rail) 
Low 
Higher tariffs on high-
carbon imports 
Mixed evidence, as low-income 
households are more dependent on 
high-carbon imports, but low-skilled 
workers might benefit from protections 
for high-carbon industries (eg coal 
mining) 
Low 
Vehicle standards More regressive than fuel taxes High 
Agriculture (eg 
standards or taxes) Limited distributional impact  Low 
Effect of climate 
policies on the labour 
market 
Likely regressive because of the skill 
bias in green industries; however, 
energy efficiency measures in buildings 
might create construction jobs 
Low 
German feed-in-tariffs 
Regressive, as they increase 
household electricity prices, while 
industry is exempted and benefits from 
a ‘merit-order’ effect 
High 
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EU ETS 
Regressive, as firms have benefited 
from free allowances, cheap 
international credits and indirect cost 
compensation at the expense of 
consumers and governments 
High 
Source: Bruegel. Note: Regressive (red/orange): low-income households are hurt 
more or benefit less than high-income households. Proportionate: low-income 
households are hurt or benefit as much as high-income households. Progressive 
(green): low-income households are hurt less or benefit more than high-income 
households. The level of our confidence in the last column is based upon the 
availability of corresponding literature, the degree of consensus in the surveyed 
literature and, where applicable, on the findings from our own analysis. 
 
We argue that the distributional effects of many effective climate 
policies can be remedied by:  
(i) Compensating lower-income households for any adverse 
effects of climate policies; 
(ii) Designing the specific policy measures in a way that 
reduces adverse distributional effects; and  
(iii) Introducing climate policies that have progressive 
features.  
Based on our analysis we derive five conclusions: 
1) Invest more in research 
More should be invested in gathering data and researching the 
distributional effects of individual climate policies. In particular, new 
research should go beyond the partial analysis of individual drivers 
and assess the aggregate distributional effects of individual policies. 
This can ultimately allow policymakers to make better informed 
choices when designing a suite of climate policies that is effective in 
mitigating emissions, while maximising welfare and social justice. 
2) Making policies less regressive 
We already know that decarbonising certain sectors has less-adverse 
distributional effects (eg aviation), that certain policies are less 
regressive than others (eg taxes compared to standards), and that 
certain design elements make policies less regressive (eg auctioning 
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emission permits instead of grandfathering them to polluters). 
Policymakers should factor such known distributional effects more 
prominently into their policy choices.   
3) Actively develop climate policies that benefit lower-income 
households 
There are climate polices – such as support for energy-efficiency 
investment in social housing – that can bring benefits to lower-income 
households. Policymakers should become more creative in 
developing such measures, not least to increase public acceptance of 
climate policies. 
4) Compensation is feasible – but needs to be done 
To achieve the ambitious decarbonisation targets, developed 
countries will have to resort to some degree to regressive carbon 
taxes on basic needs (eg heating fuel). But recycling the revenues 
from such schemes – such as through lump-sum transfers – can 
largely mitigate the distributional concerns, and should be forcefully 
implemented. 
5) An international approach can make domestic climate 
policies fairer 
Policymakers should continue to fight for a globally synchronised 
decarbonisation effort. This will create space for less regressive 
national policies as it would alleviate the competitiveness concerns of 
domestic industry, which currently are an excuse for instruments that 
benefit high-income households at the cost of low-income 
households. 
This would allow the undesirable distributional effects of climate 
policies to be better addressed and would thus increase the political 
backing necessary for the forceful climate policies that are needed to 
achieve the ambitious decarbonisation pathway to prevent global 
warming from getting out of hand.  
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1  INTRODUCTION 
In order to avoid disastrous consequences from global warming, 
greenhouse gas emissions need to be reduced drastically in the 
coming decades. In the Paris Agreement, 195 countries agreed to 
“reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as 
possible” and “achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions 
by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second 
half of this century” (UNFCCC, 2015). Such a deep decarbonisation 
process will have wide-ranging implications for the European Union. 
By about the middle of the century, no EU country will be able to use 
coal, oil or gas to warm houses, propel cars or generate electricity, 
unless this is compensated for by negative emissions. Major industrial 
sectors will have to find ways of reducing the greenhouse gas 
emissions that are now intimately linked to their production 
processes. The agricultural sector, which has so far largely been 
neglected, will have to play a much more prominent role in 
decarbonisation. And we will have to discuss what “negative emission 
technologies”1, which are now mostly theoretical, could look like in 
reality. 
Such a massive transition of our economy will only come about based 
on intrusive policies, most notably through putting a meaningful price 
on emissions, but also through fostering public support for the 
deployment of low-carbon technologies and through bans on 
inefficient technologies. Modelling exercises show that carbon prices 
up to $1,000 per tonne of emitted carbon dioxide2 will be needed in 
2050 to keep the temperature increase well below two degrees 
Celsius above pre-industrial levels. While such price levels currently 
do not appear very realistic, they indicate the intrusiveness of the 
                                               
1 Negative emissions technologies remove emissions from the atmosphere. They 
include carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies and approaches that 
increase the natural absorption of CO2, such as afforestation.  
2 However the range of estimates on necessary carbon prices is extremely wide – 
ranging from $45 to $1000 for 2050; and $140 to $8300 for the year 2100. See 
http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/14685/. 
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policies (eg deployment support) that will be needed to bring about a 
transformation that essentially reduces emissions from electricity 
generation, transport and industry to close to zero. 
Such broad policies are likely to have a number of sizeable side 
effects. One important consideration is that such policies will affect 
different parts of the population differently. And given the scope of the 
transformation, the distributional consequences could be significant.  
The distributional consequences are likely to be a major driver of 
future climate policies. Policymakers will not accept forceful 
decarbonisation policies if they lead to visibly increasing inequality 
within their societies. The distributive effects of climate policies 
therefore need to be addressed. Furthermore, policy is not only driven 
by actual distributional effects, but also its public perception 
(Dluhosch, 2018). This highlights the need to make sure that the 
public discourse provides a realistic picture of the distributional effects 
of climate policies.  
However, the distributional impact of decarbonisation has received 
relatively limited attention so far in academic and policy discussions. 
There have been a number of studies on carbon pricing that have 
focused on the higher share of carbon-intensive products in the 
consumption baskets of lower-income groups3. But these studies – 
which typically find carbon pricing to be regressive – often do not 
account for other channels, such as the household income side. 
Studies that look into the distributional impact of other climate 
policies, and those that take a more holistic perspective, are very 
rare4.  
This report provides a selective review of recent academic literature 
and experience on the distributional effects of climate policies. It 
seeks to explore different channels of distributional effects, for 
                                               
3 See summaries by Heindl and Löschel (2014), McInnes (2017) and Flues and 
Thomas (2015). 
4 Robinson et al (2014), for example, argue that distributional aspects are 
undervalued in decisions on environmental regulation in the US. 
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different types of climate policies in various sectors. While it is outside 
our scope to provide a comprehensive account of all studies on the 
distributional effects of climate policies, our selective approach allows 
us to reach a number of clear conclusions. We can identify 
consensus in the reviewed literature on crucial drivers; we also 
observe contrary results in other areas; and we identify where gaps in 
the literature exist. Furthermore, our own data-based assessments 
allow us to make educated guesses on likely effects in areas we did 
not find literature on. 
We want to clearly distinguish our research question (‘What are the 
[within-country] distributional effects of climate policies?’) from two 
related – and more widely studied – questions. The first is the global 
distributional implications of climate change and climate policy, 
which touches on academic disciplines ranging from economics to 
moral philosophy and has the goal of providing guidelines on how to 
spread the global decarbonisation effort in a ‘fair’ way between 
countries5. A second area of research is the discussion of energy 
poverty, which examines the distributional consequences of the 
current energy system (which can be huge; see section 3.1). 
Thus, we do not focus on the distribution of mitigation costs between 
countries and the vulnerability of households to energy price shocks 
under current polices. Our purpose is rather to focus on the 
distributional impact in advanced economies (such as EU countries) 
of the additional climate policies that we need to devise in order to 
achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement.  
We first describe key general drivers that explain the distributional 
effects of different climate policies in different sectors (such as 
differences in consumption of high-income and low-income 
households). Second, we discuss the distributional effects of 
individual climate policies – sometimes in individual sectors, such as 
the impact of a carbon tax on heating costs for households of different 
income classes. We then look at two major European climate policies 
                                               
5 See, for example, McCarthy et al (2001). 
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– renewables support and emissions trading – to demonstrate how 
complex real-world policies affect inequality. Fourth, we show that 
climate change itself might also have distributional consequences 
between countries and between income groups, and thus that non-
action would be heavily regressive. Fifth, we provide some 
recommendations on how to prevent climate policies from increasing 
inequality. We conclude with policy recommendations. 
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2  DRIVERS OF THE DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF 
CLIMATE POLICIES 
2.1 Analytical framework 
A major drawback of climate policies is that their burden can fall 
disproportionately on lower-income groups. A policy that is paid for 
disproportionately by low-income households is termed regressive. If 
the burden falls more heavily on the high-income households it is 
called progressive, and if the cost is distributed equally across income 
groups it is called proportionate. 
Each household is different and climate policies will affect each of 
them differently. But households with relatively similar characteristics 
will likely be affected in fairly similar ways. A number of 
characteristics determine how households are affected by a given 
climate policy. For example, a fuel tax puts a higher burden on rural 
households than on urban households 6. Other characteristics that 
could play a role include gender, nationality, wealth, income, ethnicity, 
region, job and educational level. 
In research and politics, income is typically emphasised as a factor. 
We therefore focus our attention on how households of different 
income levels are impacted differently by climate policies. It is 
important to note, however, that income is correlated with other 
characteristics. For instance, low-skilled households tend to have 
lower incomes. Hence, we do not only look into the direct impact of 
climate policies on households of different incomes, but also consider 
the indirect ways in which climate policies can alter the income 
distribution (eg by changing the demand for low-skilled workers 
relative to high-skilled workers, which indirectly alters the skill 
                                               
6 The rural/urban divide is correlated with income but in a non-linear way. In the US, 
for example, rural households have 3.5 percent lower median income, while the 
poverty rate is significantly higher for urban households (16 percent versus 13.3 
percent for rural households). The picture gets even more complex when looking at 
different regions. For example in the Northeast US, rural households also had the 
higher median income. See https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/random-
samplings/2016/12/a_comparison_of_rura.html. 
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premium and relative wages). It should be mentioned that assessing 
overall effects is challenging, since it often requires complex 
modelling. Many studies consequently limit their scope to studying 
partial effects (ie the direct effect) of climate policies. Future research 
would benefit from modelling both the direct and indirect impacts of 
climate policies, to fully assess their distributional consequences.   
In order to understand how climate policies affect households we 
refer to a very stylised model of the economic welfare of households. 
2.1.1 Income side 
Households can generate income from employing the production 
factors they possess (capital, land7 and skills). The income that can 
be drawn from employing these production factors might change as a 
consequence of climate policies. The owner of a coal mine might see 
his related capital income decline because of carbon pricing8, while a 
biotech engineer might expect to draw a higher income from his skills 
when investment in advanced biofuels is publicly promoted. 
Consequently, the value of specific skills and capital can be:  
- ‘Green’ – more valuable in a decarbonising world; 
- ‘Brown’ – less valuable in a decarbonising world; or  
- ‘Grey’ – unimpacted by decarbonisation. 
We expect capital to be mainly grey. However, the capital that is 
influenced by climate policies is more likely to be brown than green, 
because decarbonisation has only recently begun9. For labour, we 
                                               
7 Many models treat land as a form of capital. We single it out here, as the value of 
land might significantly increase because of decarbonisation (for example, as space 
for wind turbines, solar panels, biomass-planting, afforestation and other mitigation 
options). 
8 This in turn will also reduce the value of the capital itself, as capital should be 
valued according to the future income stream. 
9 FTSE Russell (2014) puts the market value of fossil-fuel companies as a share of 
total market valuation at 9-12 percent. But wider definitions might also include bonds 
of some highly fossil-fuel export dependent countries, energy inefficient real estate or 
the value of patents in fossil technology.  
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again expect the grey share to dominate, but it is hard to make an 
informed guess whether the brown or green share is greater. We 
expect the value of most land to increase with decarbonisation 
policies. Planting of biofuel crops, renewables installation and 
reforestation should increase the demand for rural land, while 
reduced noise and air pollution might increase the value of currently 
disadvantaged urban land plots 10. Hence, land is mainly green or 
grey. We would assume that the green, brown and grey shares in 
capital and land are similar for high-income and low-income 
households.  
Lower-income households generally own less production factors – in 
particular land and capital – than those with high incomes. Even 
though the market value of the skills of low-income households is 
typically lower than that of high-income households (eg in terms of 
formal education), labour represents a much higher share of the total 
income of low-income households.  
The effect of decarbonisation policies on the valuation of skills is 
unclear, and will likely depend on the decarbonisation pathway and 
other megatrends (eg automatisation, globalisation). Lower-income 
households are overrepresented in low-skilled sectors. But low-skilled 
sectors can be clearly brown (eg coal mining) but also grey (eg many 
services) or clearly green (eg construction in the context of increased 
renovation rates needed to improve the energy efficiency of the 
building stock). 
The main effect of decarbonisation on the production factor and 
income side will thus likely arise from high-income households 
receiving a greater share of their income from land and capital, while 
low-income households will receive a greater share of their income 
from skills. If capital is generally browner than skills, this might make 
decarbonisation progressive. If, however, decarbonisation increases 
                                               
10 Some land plots might become less valuable because of changing transport 
systems (such as close to airports, should aviation decarbonisation result in fewer 
passengers), and there are some radical scenarios in which, for example, suburbia 
becomes less desirable because of rising transport and heating costs. 
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the returns to capital more than the returns to labour, decarbonisation 
could be regressive.  
Households can use their budgets to invest in production factors. 
They might buy land and capital assets or engage in education (which 
has direct and indirect costs11). High-income households are more 
likely to find that such investment will increase their overall utility over 
their expected lifetime, while low-income households might draw 
more utility from meeting their basic current needs. There are several 
reasons for this: High earners have significantly longer expected 
lifetimes. In Germany, people in the highest income group (earning 
€4500 or more per month) are expected to live almost nine years 
longer than those in the lowest income group (earning €1500 or less) 
(Lauterbach et al, 2006), which gives them more time to draw more 
utility from investments. High-income households also tend to value 
the expectation that they will receive a certain amount in ten years 
more than low-income households, because high-income households 
have already met all of their basic current needs while low-income 
households can substantially increase their wellbeing by spending 
this amount today (Table 2). Furthermore, the ability of high-income 
households to invest larger amounts makes investment more 
profitable by reducing the relative share of transaction costs12. By 
contrast, low-income households might shy away from investments 
with high upfront costs (for example, rooftop solar panels) because of 
a concern that they might lose too much if the investment goes 
wrong. The greater propensity to invest means high-income 
households should be able to adjust more easily to the economic 
shifts induced by decarbonisation over time. 
Low-income households might also find it more difficult to make 
optimal use of their resources, because, for example, they might not 
be able to wait and search for the optimal job for their qualification if 
                                               
11 Opportunity cost of the hours not worked. 
12 This includes the cost involved in searching and studying different investment 
opportunities. 
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they do not have enough savings (or capacity to borrow) to search for 
a job for an extended period.  
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Figure 1: Income side 
 
 
 
2.1.2 Expenditure side 
Households spend money to acquire goods and services for 
immediate consumption, such as food, and durable goods from which 
they will benefit over a period, such as furniture. In addition, the 
government provides goods such as infrastructure, and services such 
as health care that have some utility for individual households. 
Finally, the quality of the environment also contributes to the well-
being of households. 
Households will try to acquire the combination of goods and services 
that maximises their individual utility. This is far from trivial because it 
will depend on each household’s: (i) preferences for individual goods 
and services, (ii) borrowing constraints, and (iii) total budget. High 
and low-income households differ in all three respects. 
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A household’s preference for individual goods and services 
includes:  
(a) Very personal preferences (eg a vegetarian vs. a meat-eater)13;  
(b) The so-called time preference, or the extent to which the 
household prefers current consumption over future consumption (for 
example, having an inefficient second-hand car today instead of a 
new electric vehicle in some weeks/month/years). As shown by the 
example of Denmark (Table 2), low-income households have 
significantly higher discount rates, meaning a much stronger 
preference for immediate consumption over future consumption 
compared to richer households; and 
(c) How the utility of certain goods and services to a person depend 
on the other goods and services a household already consumes. 
Some products together have a greater utility than individual products 
alone, ie they are complements, such as cars and fuel, while others 
are substitutes such as a transport season ticket and a car. 
  
  
                                               
13 It is an interesting question whether low and high-income households also have 
different individual preferences. One might hypothesise that social groups might 
develop preferences based on optimal responses to budget constraints, and that they 
maintain these over long time periods even when those budget constraints vanish. 
There is, for example, some literature that indicates that the time and risk 
preferences of representatives of different ethnic groups are systematically different, 
even when controlling for socio-economic factors. The same might hold for other 
characteristics (eg rural/urban) that also correlate to income. In this report we largely 
ignore differences in preferences (apart from section 2.7, where we look into food 
consumption). 
19 
 
Table 2: Example: discount rates by income group in Denmark 
Low-income 32.9 
Lower middle 30.1 
Upper middle 22.7 
High-income 22.5 
Source: Bruegel based on Harrison et al (2002). Note: A discount rate indicates how 
much value is attached to present consumption relative to future consumption. A 
discount rate of zero reflects indifference between present and future consumption, 
while positive discount rates imply greater preference for present consumption. In the 
table, the discount rate is highest for the low-income group, meaning these 
individuals place the greatest value on immediate relative to future consumption. 
 
Low-income households face borrowing constraints. Borrowing is 
important because people can increase their utility by borrowing 
money to smooth out their consumption or to invest in durables. 
However, low-income households have lower credit scores on 
average and no collateral to borrow against, and might therefore 
experience borrowing constraints.  
Finally, the total budgets of low-income households are significantly 
smaller than those of high-income households. Observed differences 
in consumption by high-income and low-income households can be 
largely attributed to this last element: high-income households 
consume different (often more expensive) goods and services than 
low-income households simply because they have higher budgets. 
This, for example, allows them to buy more efficient durables (eg 
refrigerators or cars) to achieve greater utility in the future. 
Consequently, while low-income households have lower immediate 
consumption, a disproportionately high share of their immediate 
consumption is brown.  
Table 3 corroborates the notion that expenditure patterns can vary 
depending on income. The table is based on Engel curve slope 
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estimates 14  from Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2016) and shows 
sectors in which low-income individuals on average spend a greater 
share of their income (red), sectors in which high-income individuals 
on average spend a greater share of their income (green), and 
sectors in which no statistically significant expenditure differences 
appear across income groups15. The table suggests that, on average, 
low-income individuals spend a greater share of their income in some 
food and manufacturing sectors (eg textiles), but a lower share in 
several service sectors (eg real estate or air transport).   
Table 3: Relationship between income and share of expenditure 
in various sectors  
Food sectors* and manufacturing 
sectors 
Service sectors 
Printing and publishing Sale, repair of motor vehicles 
Agriculture Air transport 
Food, beverages, and tobacco Other auxiliary transport activities 
Mining Real estate activities 
Textiles 
Renting of Renting of machinery and 
equipment 
Leather and footwear Education 
Coke, refined petroleum, nuclear fuel Health and social work 
Chemicals and chemical products 
Private households with employed 
persons 
Rubber and plastics Inland Transport 
Other nonmetallic minerals Electricity, gas, and water supply 
Transport equipment Construction 
Wood products 
Wholesale trade and commission 
trade 
Basic metals and fabricated metal Retail trade 
                                               
14 Engel curve slopes indicate how expenditure on a particular good or service varies 
with income. Goods with a positive slope are consumed relatively more by high-
income individuals, whereas low-income individuals spend a greater share of their 
income on goods with a negative slope. 
15 To be precise, Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2016) estimated the sectoral 
expenditure shares for countries of different income levels, and assumed that the 
expenditure differences hold for individuals of different income levels. To test this 
assumption, they also used micro-level data to estimate how sectoral expenditure 
shares vary across individuals of different income, and found similar results. 
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Machinery Hotels and restaurants 
Electrical and optical equipment Water transport 
Manufacturing, nec  Post and telecommunications 
 Financial intermediation 
 Public admin and defence 
Source: Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2016). Note: *The food sectors are 
‘Agriculture’ and ‘Food, beverages, and tobacco’, while the remaining sectors in the 
first column are manufacturing sectors. Green indicates that the share of expenditure 
in the particular sector is lower for low-income individuals. Red indicates that the 
share of expenditure in the particular sector is higher for low-income individuals. No 
colour indicates no significant relationship (on a 10 percent level) between the share 
of expenditure in the particular sector and income. The relationship between income 
and the sectoral expenditure share is statistically significant on at least a 10 percent 
level for the sectors coloured in green or red. 
 
In terms of consumption of public goods, we have no clear evidence 
but our intuition would be that at least for transport infrastructure, 
high-income households consume a greater brown share (roads, 
airports), while low-income households would consume more green 
components (public transport). 
On the expenditure side, climate policies will mainly affect prices and 
availability of individual goods and services (for example, carbon 
taxes that are passed through to final products, or environmental 
standards that result in bans on certain products). Basic goods (such 
as heating or food) form a much higher share of low-income 
households’ consumption baskets than of high-income households’ 
consumption baskets. According to the Engel curve estimate (Table 
3), climate policies that, for example, increase the price of food or 
petroleum would be regressive because low-income households 
spend a greater fraction of their incomes on these goods.  
Climate polices might make expenditure on durables that reduce the 
carbon footprint of households very beneficial. Such policies might 
include subsidies for low-carbon purchases, such as electric vehicles 
or solar panels, or for investments in energy efficiency. Policies might 
also increase the cost of high-carbon durables such as inefficient 
vehicles, fridges or houses. Households with different incomes might 
be differently affected, because they own different types of durables 
and have different capacities for adjusting their stocks of durables. 
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Existing assets – such as a detached house – might allow high-
income households to benefit from climate policies such as rooftop 
solar subsidies or energy efficiency retrofit credits. Low-income 
households might not be able to make such investments. As many 
low-carbon investments are expensive (eg an electric vehicle), the 
necessary expenditures might be out of reach for low-income 
households because of budget constraints. They might also not be 
beneficial because of lower usage or too risky as they would severely 
unbalance the asset/durables portfolios of low-income households. 
Figure 2: Expenditure side 
 
2.1.3 Government side 
The government receives taxes on the income from capital, labour 
and land, and from consumption (including of durable consumer 
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goods). The government budget is used to provide public goods such 
as public transport and transfers such as social security16. 
Most actual and discussed fiscal climate policies seek to put a price 
on carbon. While the companies that emit the carbon typically pay 
this to the tax authority (or the allowance auction office), the cost is 
passed through to consumers in the form of higher prices. Hence, in 
our stylised scheme these costs would show up as consumption 
taxes and the relative prices of consumption goods would change, 
which can have distributional effects. 
Another fiscally relevant climate policy is provision of subsidies for 
certain consumption goods (which would show as a reduction in 
corresponding consumption taxes) or assets (which would show as a 
reduction in corresponding income taxes). Hence the relative prices 
of consumption goods or incomes from assets would change, which 
can have distributional effects. 
Finally, the provision of green public goods is another fiscally relevant 
climate policy. 
Climate policies that generate government income would allow a 
government to reduce other taxes and/or increase the provision of 
transfers and public services. In theory, the government would be 
able to offset each distributional impact of a climate policy using 
targeted lump-sum transfers17, or could at least mitigate the effect by 
reducing other taxes. As the government is relatively free to use 
climate-policy related incomes either in a progressive way (such as 
through lump-sum transfers or reductions in labour taxes) or a 
                                               
16 In our highly stylised model, the government budget is meant to also include 
‘parafiscal’ implicit schemes such as emissions trading or renewables levies. 
17 Perfect compensation might require perfect information, which is not available. 
One might argue that information is costly (a lot of reporting and monitoring required 
as taxpayers cannot be trusted to declare their true economic situations – they might 
prefer to incur costs themselves to appear less rich, eg by offshoring) and hence 
there seems to be a trade-off between the lower cost of organising transfers and the 
degree to which they are targeted.  
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regressive way (such as reductions in capital taxes) we do not 
discuss this ‘recycling’ here, but in the chapter 5, on remedies. 
Thus, whether such fiscal offsets are progressive or regressive 
depends on how progressive or regressive the initial fiscal system 
is18. 
Figure 3: Government side 
 
 
2.1.4 Summary 
Climate policies can affect the welfare of households through multiple 
channels, such as their income or the value of their assets. Structural 
differences in the economic activities of low- and high-income 
households (see Figures 4 and 5 for a comparison using our stylised 
                                               
18 If a country with a very regressive fiscal structure collects carbon taxes and gives 
them back through reduced VAT, it might make the system less regressive, while the 
same policy in an initially very progressive fiscal structure might turn this system less 
progressive. That is, depending on the initial fiscal structure the same instrument 
might be progressive or regressive. 
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framework) imply that certain policies affect households differently. To 
obtain fair policy guidance, it is important to analyse the distributional 
effect of a given climate policy on each economic activity, because 
focusing only on one side might severely bias the results. For 
example, a policy that might have a disproportionate cost for lower-
income households on the expenditure side, might only negatively 
affect the returns to production factors held by high-income 
households on the income side, making the overall distributional 
effect roughly proportionate. 
The type of policy (eg standards, taxes or subsidies), the targeted 
sector (eg agriculture or aviation), the concrete policy design (eg 
thresholds or exceptions) and the characteristics of the economy (eg 
initial inequality, sector structure or whether the fiscal system is 
progressive) matter for the direction and extent of the distributional 
impact.  
Figure 4: Stylised model of the economic activities of a high-
income household 
 
  
26 
 
Figure 5: Stylised model of the economic activities of a low-
income household  
 
 
+++ 
Box 1: Measuring distributional effects 
It would be very handy to have a unique indicator in order to be able 
to compare the distributional effects of different climate policies. Such 
a unique indicator would, for example, allow calculation of whether 
one climate policy (eg a carbon tax on road fuels) increases inequality 
less than another (eg car emission standards). But distributional 
effects are too complex to be summarised by such a one-number 
indicator. The main reason is that households have multidimensional 
socio-economic characteristics, such as annual or lifetime incomes, 
wealth, annual expenditures, region, ethnic/racial backgrounds, 
gender and income sources19. Consequently, a policy might improve 
the welfare of a household with a low income and high wealth and 
reduce the welfare of another household with relatively higher income 
                                               
19 Thus, Rausch et al (2011), for example, use a model with a large number of 
households to consider distributional impacts over different sub-populations. 
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and lower wealth. That is, the same policy might increase wealth 
inequality and reduce income inequality. Most studies focus on 
income or sometimes on expenditure. 
When looking into the income distribution the observation period is 
important. Transitional low-income earners (students, pensioners) 
might look extremely vulnerable to carbon prices, while the same 
persons only spend a small fraction of their lifetime income on carbon 
taxes20.  
Distributions of a single characteristic can be summarised in 
inequality indicators such as the Gini coefficient21, ratios for different 
percentiles (99/1, 75/25)22, shares of income or wealth in the hands of 
the poorest segment of society or the Theil index23. Each of these 
indicators attaches a different weight to differences in income at the 
tails of distribution. 
In addition, even within one characteristic (eg income) the effects are 
often not linear. Very low-income earners that typically own no car 
and very high-income earners that often do not have to commute long 
distances are less affected by fuel taxes than middle-income owners 
that commute with their cars. Inequality indices – such as the Gini 
coefficient – would be unable to properly reflect such distributional 
effects. We observe that many studies on the distributional impacts of 
climate policies do not report a single figure, but rather report how the 
                                               
20 “Suppose that as people grow old their energy consumption becomes a larger 
share of their total consumption, and suppose, as well, that over a lifetime the energy 
tax has a proportional incidence, then using current consumption to measure lifetime 
income, the energy tax would appear regressive” (Hassett et al, 2009). 
21 The Gini coefficient takes a value of 0 when all individuals exhibit identical income 
or wealth and a value of 1 when total income or wealth is held by a single individual 
or household. 
22 These attach a greater weight to differences in income at the tails of distribution. 
23 The Theil index is an entropy index which measures deviation from perfect income 
inequality. It has the desirable property of being decomposable so that inequality 
within a group (intra-group inequality) and between groups (inter-group inequality) 
can be estimated.  
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analysed policy changes the expenditure/income/welfare for each 
decile of the income or expenditure distribution. 
Overall, we observe significant differences in the way different studies 
measure distributional effects. This makes it very difficult to compare 
the size of the distributional effect or even aggregate the results of 
different studies. 
+++ 
2.2 Carbon pricing 
Putting a sensible price on emissions is seen by many economists as 
the most economic way to reduce emissions (eg Cramton et al, 
2017). A carbon price can be implemented through price-based 
instruments such as taxes or quantity-based instruments whereby a 
limited number of emissions allowances are issued after which the 
emissions price is determined by the market. There are systems that 
foresee a single carbon price for all sectors (eg the EU emissions 
trading system, see section 3.2), and a set of schemes that determine 
different prices for different sectors (such as aviation emissions, see 
section 2.2.4). 
Impact of sectoral carbon prices is a proxy for other sectoral 
climate policies 
Policies other than an explicit price on emissions in a particular sector 
can have relatively similar effects to a carbon price. For example, 
electricity taxes or road fuel prices – even if not explicitly tied to 
emissions – act in the same way as a carbon price. Furthermore, 
many regulatory tools to tackle emissions have broadly similar 
distributional consequences to putting a price on carbon. For 
example, emission standards for particular production technologies 
(eg power plants) increase the cost of the corresponding products (eg 
electricity) for consumers and reduce the value of corresponding 
capital for producers. In contrast to carbon pricing, standards 
generate no direct income for governments and instead of only 
discouraging the most emitting activities, many standards outright ban 
technologies even if used in less-polluting modes (eg coal-fired power 
plants used as back-up).  
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The empirical literature on the distributional impact of climate policies 
other than (implicit) carbon prices – such as subsidies or standards – 
is relatively sparse. Hence, the more numerous studies on the 
distributional impact of putting an implicit or explicit price on carbon 
discussed in this section can also serve as a good first approximation 
of the distributional impact of other non-fiscal measures.  
General effect 
A carbon price has two effects: (1) it raises product prices, by making 
it costlier for producers to pollute, and (2) it alters returns to factors of 
production (specifically, capital and labour). The first effect is typically 
regressive, as lower-income households spend a larger share of their 
income on many emissions-intensive products (eg heat and 
electricity) than higher-income households, and lower-income 
households have less opportunity to switch to less emissions-
intensive substitutes. The second effect is more likely than not slightly 
progressive, as emissions-intensive capital assets that lose value in 
the transition will be predominantly held by high-income households. 
However, high-income households will also hold those capital assets 
that might increase in value thanks to increasing carbon prices, such 
as shares in wind turbine manufacturers.  
Effects differ by sector 
The effects of carbon prices will differ for different sectors. First, the 
so-called incidence of the carbon price –how it is split between 
consumers and producers – depends on the targeted product. For 
products for which consumers can easily switch to alternative low-
carbon products, the high-carbon producers will have to pay the 
carbon tax, or lose the consumers. By contrast, for products where no 
low-carbon alternatives are available, producers can pass through the 
carbon price to final consumers. Furthermore, the ability of producers 
to reduce prices determines the carbon price incidence. For products 
that cannot be offered at lower prices, consumers will have to pay the 
carbon price if they want to have the product, while for products that 
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producers would even offer if the price were much lower, the 
producer will have to absorb a higher share of the carbon price24. 
Second, some products/services, such as electricity, take a higher 
share of low-income households’ expenditures and putting a tax on 
them will likely be regressive. Other products/services, such as 
aviation, are in much higher demand from high-income households 
and a tax on them might be progressive (see Table 4). 
In the following, we review the literature on the distributional effects of 
carbon prices (equivalent fiscal measures) for road fuel, electricity, 
heating, air transport and maritime transport.  
  
                                               
24 That is, in economics jargon, the carbon tax incidence depends on the relative 
elasticity of supply and demand for the product. 
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Table 4: Summary table of greenhouse-gas emissions and share 
of overall household consumption expenditure for sectors 
affected by carbon pricing 
Category 
name in our 
report 
Share of 
total 
emissions 
(EU28) 
Share of expenditure on 
sector/product in overall 
household expenditure (Italy) 
Engel curve 
slope 
estimate† 
Lowest 
20% 
Average 
HH 
Highest 
20%  
Air transport 3.7% 0.1% 0.3% 0.5% 0.07* 
Road fuel 12.1% 5.6% 4.7% 3.9% -0.89*** 
Agriculture 9.7% 21.8% 16.4% 12.0% -1.25*** 
Electricity 
23.0% 
3.9% 2.0% 1.3% -0.33 
Heating 3.5% 2.4% 1.8% -  
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat (n.d.) (which sourced from the EEA), Italian 
National Institute of Statistics (2017), and Engel curve slope estimates from 
Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2016). Note: †Multiplied by 100. An Engel curve slope 
estimate indicates how the expenditure on a particular good or service varies with 
income. Goods with a statistically significant positive slope estimate are consumed 
relatively more by high-income households (green), whereas low-income households 
spend a larger share of their income on goods with a statistically significant negative 
slope estimate (red). ***Significant at 1 percent level; **significant at 5 percent level; 
*significant at 10 percent level. All data besides the Engel curve slope estimates are 
for 2016. The category names in each source are reported in Table A in the annex.  
 
2.2.1 Road fuel 
Road transport emissions account for about a fifth of EU emissions25. 
Road transport will therefore be a main area for decarbonisation 
policies; putting a price on carbon emissions from road fuels is a 
                                               
25 In 2015, all transport emissions accounted for 25.8 percent of EU emissions, of 
which road transport was responsible for 72.8 percent. 
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much-discussed idea. The European Commission in 2011, for 
example, proposed a CO2 component as part of the EU Energy 
Taxation Directive that would also cover road fuels26. While there is 
little empirical evidence on adding specific carbon taxes to road fuels, 
ample academic literature exists on the distributional effects of 
general road fuel taxes. We will refer to this literature, as general 
gasoline and diesel taxes have similar effects to specific carbon taxes 
on road fuels27. 
Figure 6: Stylised scheme of the distributional effect of a carbon 
tax on road fuel 
 
Figure 6 summarises, in a simplified way, the effects of a carbon tax 
on the flows of a household. The arrows represent various flows: the 
government raises money to spend in the public budget by taxing 
                                               
26 Because of opposition from EU countries this proposal was, however, withdrawn in 
2015. 
27 In contrast to gasoline taxes, toll systems might privilege larger and more 
inefficient cars. 
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income and consumption, which is then reinvested as government 
expenditure (eg on public goods) or given back to households in the 
form of transfers. The household represented, instead, can decide to 
consume its budget in different ways: immediate (food, petrol, an 
airplane ticket etc) or by purchasing durable goods (eg a car or solar 
panels); or can invest it in production factors (human capital, capital, 
land). The household derives a direct utility from consumption of the 
different type of goods, as well as from the environmental quality. 
In Figure 6, we represent the effect on transport of a carbon tax levied 
by the government. Immediate consumption (for example of fossil 
fuel) is reduced as a result of the increased price, whereas the 
household will have a greater incentive to invest in an electric car. 
This shifting effect will still reduce the overall utility of the household. 
On the investment side, the investment in brown capital will be 
reduced in favour of green capital. 
Early studies generally found that gasoline taxes are regressive 
(Dumagan and Mount, 1992; Brännlund and Nordström 2004; West 
and Williams III, 2004). However, Tiezzi (2005) suggested that high-
income households in Italy lost disproportionately more from a carbon 
tax introduced in 1999. As the tax increased the price of transport 
fuels, Tiezzi (2005) suggested that the disproportionate impact might 
arise because high-income households were more likely to own a car. 
Moreover, Flues and Thomas (2015) found that taxes on road-fuel 
consumption in 21 OECD countries were, on average, progressive.  
In a limited meta-analysis Davis and Knittel (2016) observed that 
Burtraw et al (2009), Fullerton et al (2012) and Hassett et al (2009) 
found gasoline taxes to be regressive, while West (2004) and West 
and Williams III (2004) found that gasoline taxes were progressive for 
low-income households and regressive for high-income households.  
Taken together, the literature generally indicates mixed results about 
whether putting a carbon price on road fuel is regressive.  
2.2.2 Electricity 
In 2013, electricity and heat accounted for 31 percent of global 
emissions (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2018). World 
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electricity demand increased by around 3 percent in 2017, which was 
significantly higher than the overall increase in energy demand 
(International Energy Agency, 2018).  
In a study of 21 OECD countries, Flues and Thomas (2015) showed 
that electricity taxes are regressive on average 28 , on both an 
expenditure basis and an income basis. Figure 7, replicated from 
Flues and Thomas (2015), shows this. The downward sloping orange 
line indicates that, on average, those earning less spend a greater 
share of their income on electricity taxes. Similarly, the negatively 
sloped blue line suggests that, on average, the share of expenditure 
on taxes is higher for households with low overall spending. However, 
the income spent on electricity in the study is between 0 and 2 
percent, which suggests that the taxes’ regressive impact in absolute 
terms is limited.  
 
                                               
28 Though the degree to which electricity taxes are regressive varies across countries 
in the study. 
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Figure 7: Average electricity taxes (21 OECD countries) as a 
percentage of net income or pre-tax expenditure 
 
Source: Flues and Thomas (2015). 
 
A later study by Tovar Reaños and Wölfing (2018) found supporting 
evidence for Flues and Thomas (2015). The analysis, performed for 
Germany, is special because it employed both a novel econometric 
method and a highly detailed dataset. The dataset allowed the 
researchers to model demand for electricity and heating separately, 
which is typically difficult. They found that an increase in the electricity 
price has regressive consequences. A 20 percent increase in 
electricity prices raises inequality by around 0.24 percent (as 
measured by the Gini index). Low-income households are also found 
to reduce their electricity consumption to a greater extent than high-
income households in response to price increases. 
In essence, therefore, there is evidence that electricity taxes are 
regressive. Flues and Thomas (2015) suggest several reasons why: 
1. Inelastic demand. All modern households require a minimum 
amount of electricity, for fridges, freezers, televisions, lamps and 
36 
 
other appliances. This restricts the ability of households to reduce 
consumption in response to a price increase. Further, it is difficult to 
switch to substitutes for electricity as few exist. Such ‘inelastic’ 
demand means that households only reduce electricity consumption 
by a little if the price increases. Since low-income households spend 
a greater share of their income on electricity, a tax disproportionately 
hurts them. 
2. Credit constraints. Low-income households might own older 
electrical appliances that consume more electricity. They might also 
lack the financial means to buy new efficient appliances. 
2.2.3 Heating 
Flues and Thomas (2015) and Tovar Reaños and Wölfing (2018) also 
analysed the distributional effects of taxes on residential heating. 
Both studies found that heat taxation is regressive. Tovar Reaños and 
Wölfing (2018) estimated that heat taxes bring about a welfare loss 
two to three times greater than that resulting from electricity taxes. 
Flues and Thomas (2015), in contrast argued that electricity taxes 
tend to be more regressive than taxes on heating fuel.  
The notion that heating taxes are extremely regressive might seem 
intuitive because low-income households might live in poorly 
insulated houses. However, as noted by Flues and Thomas (2015), 
these taxes might actually only be slightly regressive because the 
low-income households are more likely to:  
1. Live in smaller dwellings that require less heating;  
2. Live in apartment blocks that require less heating compared to 
detached houses; and 
3. React to increasing cost by using less heat, since they can heat to 
lower temperatures, heat only part of their houses or switch off 
the heating when leaving the house. 
Thus, though heating taxes are likely regressive, the extent to which 
they disproportionately hurt low-income households compared to, for 
instance, electricity taxes, is unclear. 
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2.2.4 Air transport 
Direct emissions from aviation account for about three percent of the 
EU’s total greenhouse gas emissions and for more than two percent 
of global emissions. If global aviation was a country, it would be one 
of the world’s ten largest emitters29. 
The distributional effects of air transport have not been extensively 
studied, but the evidence suggests that air transport taxes are 
unlikely to be regressive (Leicester and O'Dea, 2008). It seems 
intuitive that high-income households are more likely to fly and spend 
larger portions of their incomes on air travel. Jones (2007) shows that 
in the UK, the lowest income quintile spent about 0.08 percent of their 
income on an air transport tax, compared to 0.1 percent for the 
highest quintile. 
Figure 8 suggests that people who travel by plane are wealthy. The 
figure compares the upper boundaries of the income deciles of UK 
airline passengers with those of the UK population. While the poorest 
10 percent of travellers have similar incomes to the poorest 10 
percent of the UK population, the income disparity grows for higher 
income deciles. The richest 10 percent of travellers, for instance, earn 
at least £80,000, compared to £35,000 for the richest 10 percent of 
the UK population. The figure suggests that a typical air traveller is 
richer than a typical citizen. Thus, an air travel fuel tax would be 
unlikely to be regressive, since it would primarily hit high-income 
households.  
                                               
29 See https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation_en. According to 
SWD(2017) 31 final, the EU is currently responsible for 35 percent of global aviation 
emissions. 
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Figure 8: Upper cut-off points of the income deciles of UK airline 
passengers and the UK population in 2016 
 
Source: Bruegel based on Civil Aviation Authority (2016) and Eurostat. Note: The UK 
airline passenger income data is only available in intervals and, consequently, the 
average value of the cut-off interval corresponding to each income decile is used. 
 
2.2.5 Maritime transport 
Maritime transport encompasses both goods and passengers. We 
focus on the transport of goods because this accounts for the 
greatest share of maritime emissions 30 . Maritime trade activity 
depends on transportation costs, but these costs are expected to 
increase when carbon emissions need to be drastically cut. Maritime 
transport emitted 2.2 percent of global greenhouse gases in 2012 but 
could be responsible for 17 percent of global CO2 emissions in 2050 
if left unregulated, according to Cames et al (2015). A first agreement 
was reached in April 2018, when more than 100 nations attending the 
United Nations International Maritime Organization (IMO) reached an 
                                               
30 Ferries and passenger ships account for only 0.3 percent of the dead-weight 
tonnage of all ships (UNCTAD, 2017, p.25).  
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agreement to halve their greenhouse gases emissions from shipping 
by 205031. 
A carbon price for maritime emissions32 would incentivise firms to 
reduce emissions but would also increase the shipping costs for 
goods. Global maritime transport accounts for around one billion 
tonnes of CO2 per year33, implying that a carbon price of €25 per 
tonne of CO2 would increase annual sea-borne transport costs by 
€25 billion. This corresponds to approximately 12 percent34 of global 
maritime fuel costs. 
An increase in transport costs could translate into higher prices for 
imported products. If domestic substitutes exist, demand for imports 
might decrease and thereby suppress the volume of trade. According 
to Shapiro (2016), bilateral trade could decrease by eight percent if 
trade costs rise by one percent35. In theory, one might expect an 
especially severe contraction in the trade in bulky low-value goods, 
since shipping costs make up a large share of their final price 
(Kollamthodi et al, 2013). We, however, found no clear evidence that 
such goods constitute a disproportionate share of low-income 
households’ expenditures. Kollamthodi et al (2013) found no 
significant effect from the introduction of a maritime carbon price on 
                                               
31 See International Maritime Organisation (2018) ‘UN Body adopts climate change 
strategy for shipping’, retrieved from 
http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/06GHGinitialstrategy.aspx. 
32 Introducing a carbon price, through a maritime Emissions Trading System, was 
presented as one of the medium to long-term options to reduce European maritime 
emissions by the European Commission in 2013. 
33 See https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/shipping_en. 
34 The global maritime fuel costs were calculated manually. In 2016, oil demand from 
bunkers was 7.7 million barrels per day (International Energy Agency, 2017a), equal 
to 2.8 billion barrels per year. Assuming a price per barrel of €70, annual global 
maritime fuel costs were around €200 billion. A carbon cost of €25 billion 
corresponds to approximately 12 percent of this amount.  
35 It should be noted that this relationship between trade volumes and trade costs is 
for trade in general, and not specifically for maritime trade. Indeed, Shapiro (2016) 
combines data on trade by sea, air, rail and road. Though the analysis is not only 
restricted to maritime trade, it suggests maritime trade would decrease if a carbon 
price were introduced in this sector. 
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the prices of various commodities (including fuel) in 2030. According 
to Kollamthodi et al (2013), the disposable income of all 
socioeconomic groups would be largely unaffected.  
There is thus some evidence that a maritime carbon price might not 
be regressive. However, estimating the distributional impact is a 
complex task that requires careful modelling for two major reasons:  
First, the cost of imported intermediate goods will affect final goods 
prices in complex ways (eg substitution in the value chain). Predicting 
the effect of a maritime carbon tax on product prices is therefore 
challenging.  
Second, transportation costs per value vary greatly for different 
goods. Products such as cement clinker and salt are heavy and thus 
are likely to be costlier to transport and have a relatively low trade 
value (Figure 9). This suggests that transportation costs are a large 
part of their product price. However, crude oil has a high trade value, 
suggesting transport costs are a smaller proportion of its final price. A 
maritime carbon price would likely affect demand for different goods 
differently, depending on how much of the product price is made up of 
transport costs. This suggests that care should be taken when 
drawing conclusions about the overall distributional impact of a 
maritime carbon price. 
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Figure 9: Global export volumes and weights of five 
commodities (ordered by export value per weight) 
 
Source: Bruegel based on UN Comtrade. 
 
2.3 Subsidies 
To pursue climate objectives, many governments provide incentives 
for investment in low-carbon technologies or for consumption of 
goods and services that are produced by such technologies. These 
incentives can be direct subsidies, such as for R&D into carbon 
capture and storage, tax breaks, such as for purchase of electric 
vehicles, or para-fiscal instruments such as feed-in tariffs, for 
example for roof-top solar.  
Investment subsidies are often found to be regressive, because only 
companies or high-income households have the capital to invest in 
new low-carbon assets. 
Early evidence from West (2004) showed that subsidies for new 
vehicles are more regressive than taxes on gasoline. By comparing a 
gasoline tax to a new vehicle subsidy in California, she found that the 
gasoline tax (or equivalently the mileage tax) was only regressive 
above a certain income level. This is because many low-income 
households do not own vehicles and, in response to a price increase, 
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lower-income households reduce miles by more than wealthy 
households. The subsidy, on the other hand primarily benefits high-
income households that buy new cars. Therefore, the subsidy had 
more negative distributional effects than the gasoline tax. 
Grösche and Schröder (2014) analysed the German feed-in tariff 
system, which uses a levy on electricity consumption to subsidise 
households’ use of solar panels. They found that the tariff was 
regressive, but only mildly so. 
In 2016, Germany implemented a €4,000 subsidy for the purchase of 
electric vehicles. The subsidy is financed through increased fuel 
prices. Tovar Reaños and Sommerfeld (2018) showed that the 
subsidy is regressive and resulted in a greater welfare loss for lower-
income households. The reason for this is that only higher-income 
households benefited from the subsidy because lower-income 
households would not buy an expensive new electric vehicle even if 
subsidised.  
The same probably holds true for tax breaks and preferential loans for 
energy efficiency investments in the building sector, which will mainly 
benefit the typically higher-income households that own a house and 
can afford to modernise it. 
In essence, many low-carbon subsidies are regressive because they 
reduce the price of goods that are primarily bought by higher-income 
households. Subsidising clean vehicles, for instance, benefits those 
who can afford to buy the vehicles, while the less affluent gain little36. 
2.4 Public investment 
Another support scheme for low-carbon technologies is direct 
investment by governments in low-carbon technologies or 
                                               
36 In Norway, where electric cars make up one third of the car market, there is a 
debate on the nature of the incentives for electric vehicles. Reportedly they primarily 
helped wealthy people who could afford to buy an electric car as a second vehicle. 
See Milne (2017) ‘Reality of subsidies drives Norway’s electric car dream’, Financial 
Times, retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/84e54440-3bc4-11e7-821a-
6027b8a20f23. 
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complementary infrastructure, such as public transport or charging 
infrastructure for electric vehicles. The literature on the distributional 
effects of such investment in developed countries is scarce. However, 
for developing countries, several studies indicate that public 
investment can reduce inequality.  
Dercon (2014) examined public investment in developing countries 
and discussed its likely impact on low-income households. One policy 
he discusses is moving investment away from long-distance transport 
and allocating it to local development. According to Dercon, this could 
hurt marginalised communities because they might lose access to 
cheaper products they consume and markets for their local products. 
This indicates that the distributional impact depends on both the 
details of the particular investment project and the economic context. 
It is, for example, quite conceivable that increasing spending on 
urban transport at the expense of spending on long-distance transport 
could have the reverse effect to that found by Dercon (2014) in 
countries with different spatial settings.   
In an International Monetary Fund report, Furceri and Li (2017) found 
that increased public investment reduces income inequality. However, 
the effect of public investment on inequality depends on whether 
infrastructure generates productivity gains only in the sector involved 
or also in other sectors. The authors concluded that public investment 
improves the income distribution and also has positive 
macroeconomic consequences, such as raising output and crowding-
in private investment.  
Evidence from De Ferranti et al (2004), Fan and Zhang (2004) and 
Calderón and Servén (2004) from China and Latin America, suggests 
that public investment in infrastructure such as roads, dams, and 
telecommunications has contributed toward the alleviation of 
inequality and poverty.  
By contrast, Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2012) found that while 
government spending on public capital leads to a persistent increase 
in wealth inequality in terms of income dispersion, it also increases 
growth and average welfare. Furthermore, access to paved roads has 
44 
 
had limited distributional benefits in rural Bangladesh, according to 
Khandker and Koolwal (2007). 
To summarise, the distributional consequences of public investment 
depend on several factors. Investment that disproportionately benefits 
high-income households can exacerbate inequalities. However, there 
is also a need to consider the indirect benefits of the investment. If 
the investment is ‘productive’ and generates spill-over benefits for 
low-income households, the adverse distributional consequences can 
be mitigated. Finally, the way in which the investment is financed 
matters. A tax on capital can mean that high-income households pay 
relatively more for the investment. On the other hand, if the 
investment is financed by a tax on goods consumed relatively more 
by low-income households, it would be more likely to be regressive. 
2.5 Trade policy 
Around 22 percent of global CO2 emissions stem from the 
consumption of goods that are produced in another country (Peters et 
al, 2012). Using 2004 trade data, Davis and Caldeira (2010) 
furthermore found evidence of substantial CO2 flows from China into 
the US, Europe and Japan. Moreover, in that year, the US was a net 
exporter of CO2 to Europe, with the CO2 intensity of its exports 
exceeding that of its imports.  
Trade policy is a decarbonisation instrument that is not massively 
used at present, though it has been widely discussed. Countries 
could impose trade restrictions to reduce imports from countries with 
less-stringent climate policies37. The rationale would be: (1) to avoid 
placing domestic producers, which must abide by stricter 
environmental regulation, at a competitive disadvantage, since this 
could lead them to relocate their production activities abroad; and (2) 
                                               
37 This might come in different forms. A very imprecise tool would be to not enter into 
trade agreements with countries that did not join (or do not comply) with the Paris 
Agreement. A much more sophisticated approach are so-called carbon border 
adjustments, where the carbon content of imported goods falls under an import tariff 
or consumption tax.  
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to encourage trading partners to reduce emissions. Alternatively, 
countries can promote decarbonisation by reducing trade restrictions 
on environmentally friendly goods38. 
The distributional impact of a tariff on carbon-intensive foreign 
products will on the expenditure side behave like a carbon tax. That 
is, consumers who spend a disproportionate share of their income on 
these imported carbon-intensive goods will be adversely affected, 
with the effect being stronger when there are no inexpensive 
substitutes. The issue is complicated by the fact that many carbon-
intensive products are not directly consumed, but are intermediate 
goods (such as metallurgic and chemical products and cement), used 
in the production of final consumer goods. The distributional effect on 
the expenditure side will be shaped by the design of the policy, in 
particular the size of the tariffs on individual import goods39.  
Analysing trade data from 40 countries, Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal 
(2016) showed that low-income households gain most from trade on 
the expenditure side. Thus, if trade is restricted or limited, low-income 
households are also hurt the most. This is because, in the 2005-07 
data used by Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal, low-income households 
spend a larger fraction of their income on goods that are likely traded. 
On the other hand, high-income households spend more on services, 
which are often produced domestically. Therefore, when trade is 
reduced, the consumption baskets of low-income households are 
more strongly affected. 
On the income side, the owners of production factors that are 
required to produce substitutes for carbon-intensive imports will see 
their corresponding income increase. It is not only capital owners who 
might benefit from such protection; labour employed in these sectors 
might also benefit. New evidence seems to confirm that trade barriers 
                                               
38 Since July 2014, several members of the World Trade Organisation have been 
negotiating an Environmental Goods Agreement to remove barriers to trade in goods 
that are crucial for environmental protection and climate change mitigation. 
39 Design elements include differentiation by good and/or country of origin and if 
there are exemptions. 
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reduce the wage-premium for high-skilled labour40. The benefits for 
capital owners might be even greater in sectors where locking out 
foreign competitors enables individual domestic firms to assume 
dominant positions. Such firms can translate their newly acquired 
market power into mark-ups which would transfer wealth from 
consumers to these firms (and their owners). Without a proper 
quantitative analysis of a concrete policy proposal it is not possible to 
establish whether the gains of low-skilled workers in now-protected 
sectors or the gains of the corresponding capital owners will 
dominate. 
Finally, the government can redistribute import tariff income either in 
a progressive or regressive way – dampening or exacerbating the 
initial distributional effect. 
Table 5: Stylised distributional effects of trade barriers 
 Low income High income 
Relative consumption 
expenditures 
↑ (consumes more 
foreign products) 
↓ (consumes more 
domestic services) 
Wage-premium ↑  ↓ (skill becomes relatively 
less scarce) 
Capital income ↔ (has none) ↑ (less competition 
increases mark-up) 
Redistribution of tariff 
income 
↕ (depends on policy) ↕ (depends on policy) 
Source: Bruegel. Note: Trade barrier improves/deteriorates relative welfare of this 
group along this channel. 
 
                                               
40 For across-the-board trade barriers, Borusyak and Jaravel (2018) argued that the 
college wage-premium is reduced by trade barriers. According to their analysis, 
college graduates work in industries that: (1) are less exposed to import competition; 
(2) export more; (3) are more income elastic; and (4) use fewer imported inputs. They 
find that a 10 percent increase in all import and export barriers generates a modest 
reduction in inequality between education groups. Welfare losses are 16 percent 
higher for college graduates than for individuals without a college degree. 
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The distributional impact of general trade barriers depends on the 
relative size of several individual effects (Table 5 shows some of 
them) that have not yet been unambiguously quantified. Accordingly, 
the distributional impact of trade barriers specifically on high-carbon 
products – that should follow the same general mechanics – is also 
unclear. But it is likely that, in the absence of compensation through 
revenue recycling, the regressive effects will dominate. 
2.6 Standards 
In our context, standards are mandates or regulations that discourage 
or ban products that do not meet certain characteristics, such as 
products that have too-high energy consumption or emissions. For 
example, the corporate average fuel economy (CAFE), discussed 
below, is a set of US and European standards for automobile fleet 
fuel efficiency. 
Economists have long argued that taxes are more efficient than 
standards in reducing vehicle emissions (Levinson, 2016). Jacobsen 
(2013) found that the US fuel efficiency standards cost three to ten 
times as much as a gasoline tax per ton of carbon dioxide avoided. At 
a first glance, the US CAFE standard on new vehicles seems 
progressive, since the high-income buy more new cars and thus bear 
a heavier burden (Davis and Knittel, 2016). However, if one considers 
the impact on used vehicles, the standard can become regressive 
(Davis and Knittel, 2016; Jacobsen, 2013). Fleet standards 
encourage producers to ask for higher prices for less-efficient cars 
and to reduce the prices for more efficient cars, in order to meet their 
fleet standards. The price increase for less efficient cars trickles down 
to the second-hand market. Hence, the standard constitutes an 
implicit tax on cars that are preferred by less-wealthy households. By 
contrast, standards can be seen as subsidies on efficient cars as 
producers reduce their prices to sell more of them in order to reduce 
their fleet-average emissions in order to be allowed to sell more-
polluting cars (Levinson, 2016). 
There is also evidence that standards can be regressive even if they 
do not apply to used products. According to Levinson (2016), it is 
rational for high-income households to buy more expensive, energy 
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efficient cars and for low-income households to buy less efficient cars 
– even if discount rates41 are the same. As high-income households 
drive more, an energy-efficient car saves them a lot of energy and 
money over time. Low-income households, by contrast, might prefer a 
car that is cheaper up-front because they drive less. This suggests 
that wealthy households benefit more from vehicle energy standards 
because they have a stronger preference for efficient cars. 
Standards for furnace fans 42  have also fallen under academic 
scrutiny. In a US Department of Energy cost-benefit analysis of 
furnace fan standards, the standards’ benefits were found to outweigh 
their costs (DoE, 2014). However, Miller (2015) argued that the 
assumption of low and uniform discounting rate for all households is 
unrealistic. Low-income households tend to have higher discount 
rates because they place relatively more emphasis on present, as 
opposed to future, consumption43. A subsequent analysis by Miller 
(2015) argued that the costs of the furnace fan standards were 
greater than the benefits, and that the standards were regressive. 
Beyond automotive or furnace fan standards, standards might in fact 
be regressive in all sectors – vehicles, household appliances and 
construction – according to Levinson (2016), and more regressive 
than carbon prices. This is because standards: (1) fall more heavily 
on less-frequent users (who often have higher incomes); and (2) do 
not allow for progressive revenue recycling schemes. 
                                               
41 See section 2.1 for a more detailed discussion of discount rates. 
42 Furnace fans use electricity to circulate air heated by the furnace into the living 
space. 
43 Quote from Miller (2015): “only high-income households are adequately 
represented by a 3 percent discount rate, the rate DOE uses to calculate the benefits 
of energy efficiency standards. Even median-income US households have 
significantly higher discount rates of 27 percent for the purchase of energy-using 
durables, such as furnace fans (Hausman 1979, 53). It is worth noting that 
consumers reveal lower discount rates for air conditioners than for other energy-
using durables such as furnaces (Ruderman et al, 1987, 114), meaning that median- 
and low-income households may have even higher discount rates for furnace fans 
than those found in Hausman’s analysis”. 
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Although much of the literature shows that efficiency standards are 
regressive, there are a few caveats. First, many studies do not 
account for the long-term effects of efficiency standards. For 
example, standards push engineers from various industries to 
innovate. Second, especially in developing countries, some 
governments find it very difficult to collect taxes while standards might 
be easier to enforce (Fullerton and Muehlegger, 2017).  
2.7 Agriculture 
Agriculture is, after the energy sector, the second largest emitter of 
greenhouse gases, accounting for about 10 percent of total global 
emissions in 201444. Thus, decarbonisation policies will likely target 
the agricultural sector in the future. Beyond the direct cost impact of 
emissions reductions in agriculture, decarbonisation policies in other 
sectors might also substantially affect food prices. The production of 
biofuels can increase crop prices, though the range of estimates in 
the literature is wide45. Higher crop prices, in turn, lead to higher food 
prices. If, for example, bioenergy with carbon capture and storage 
and land-use based negative-emission technologies become key 
pillars of global decarbonisation, food prices might increase. 
The highest-income households (top-fifth) only spend 19 percent 46 
more on food than the lowest-income households (bottom-fifth), while 
their overall equivalent disposable income is more than 150 percent 
higher47. Hence, higher food costs arising from climate policies might 
affect low-income households relatively more than high-income 
households.  
                                               
44 Calculated manually using data from the CAIT Climate Data Explorer of the World 
Resources Institute, available at: http://cait.wri.org. 
45 https://www.epa.gov/environmental-economics/economics-biofuels. 
46 Calculated manually using data from the UK government Family Food 2016/17 
survey, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/family-food-201617. 
47 Calculated manually using data from the UK Office for National Statistics, available 
at: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdfinanc
es/incomeandwealth/datasets/householddisposableincomeandinequality. 
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However, food preferences differ and climate policies will affect prices 
of various agricultural products differently. Carbon-intensive food 
products will likely become disproportionately more expensive when 
agricultural emissions are regulated48. For example, the greenhouse 
gas emissions that can be attributed to the production of one kilogram 
of beef can be up to 70 kilograms of CO2 equivalent (Opio et al, 
2013)49. At a beef price of $4 per kilogram50, a carbon price of $30 
/tonne would thus increase beef prices by 7 percent. For vegetables, 
the effect of an equivalent carbon price would be barely noticeable. 
In theory, this could have distributional implications because low and 
high-income households do not spend the same amount on all food 
products. This is shown in Figure 10, which compares the difference 
in expenditure for various food items of the highest-income 
households compared to the lowest-income households in the UK. 
The high-income households spend an additional 40 percent or more 
on rice, salmon, chicken and beef, while the low-income households 
spend more on milk.  
                                               
48 And land-intensive food products might become disproportionately more expensive 
when land demand increases because of land-use based decarbonisation 
approaches (such as biofuels or reforestation).  
49 Other studies find significantly lower values. A study for Canada (Desjardins et al, 
2012) estimated less than 20 kilograms of CO2 equivalent per kilogram of beef. 
50 https://www.statista.com/statistics/675826/average-prices-meat-beef-worldwide/. 
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Figure 10: Differences in expenditure on food items by the 
richest relative to the poorest UK households 
 
Source: Bruegel based on the Family Food 2016/17 survey of the United Kingdom 
(see Government of the United Kingdom, 2018). Note: The ‘highest-income 
households’ and ‘lowest-income households’ are those in income quintiles one and 
five respectively in the Family Food survey. The food items in the figure correspond 
to the categories in the Family Food survey as listed in Table B in the Annex. 
 
In view of the price differences for some food items, a key question is 
how various consumer groups will be affected by changes in food 
prices resulting from climate policies. One hypothesis is that food 
prices will change differently for various consumer groups, meaning 
that some households might pay much more for food because of 
climate policies.  
Figure 11 shows the shares of total expenditure on food that goes to 
food with low and high-carbon content per kilogramme for UK 
households. High-income households spend greater shares of their 
income compared to low-income households on low-emission food. 
However, low and high-income households spend equal proportions 
on high-emission food. This suggests that a carbon tax on food would 
not affect low and high-income households very differently.  
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Figure 11: Shares of low- and high-emissions food in total food 
expenditure, by household income quintile 
 
Source: Bruegel based on the Family Food 2016/17 survey of the United Kingdom 
(see Government of the United Kingdom, 2018), FAOSTAT, and Hamerschlag and 
Venkat (2011). Note: The total expenditure used to calculate the shares in the figure 
correspond to the category ‘Purchases for household supplies - Food and drink, 
excluding soft drinks, alcoholic drinks and confectionery’ in the Family Food survey. 
‘Low-emissions food’ comprises ‘Rice’, ‘Milk’, ‘Chicken’, ‘Eggs’, and ‘Fruits and 
vegetables’. ‘High emissions-food’ are ‘Beef and veal’, ‘Natural cheese’, ‘Lamb’, 
‘Salmon’, and ‘Pork’. The authors grouped the food items into the two emissions 
categories based on their CO2 intensity (i.e. the kg CO2eq/kg product). Data on CO2 
intensity were sourced for all food items except ‘Fruits and vegetables’ from 
FAOSTAT and Hamerschlag and Venkat (2011). CO2 intensity data for ‘Fruits and 
vegetables’ were unavailable and thus, this item was assumed to contain a low share 
of CO2. The food item names differed in the Family Food survey from the emissions 
intensity data sources, and thus had to be reconciled (see Table B in the Annex for 
the names in the sources). 
 
A limitation of Figure 11 is that it groups food items by their emissions 
intensity, and not by the carbon content of the food quantity actually 
consumed. If high-emission food is consumed in smaller amounts, 
total emissions from these food items might be small, even though 
their carbon intensity in CO2/kg is high. 
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To overcome this limitation, we calculated51 the quantities consumed 
of most food items52 by each household type, and multiplied the food 
quantities by the emissions intensity of each food item. Aggregating 
across all food items gives the total CO2 content in weekly food 
consumption per household type (blue bars in Figure 12). High-
income households account for more carbon content in their food 
than low-income households. Multiplying the carbon content by an 
assumed carbon price of £20 per tonne gives the value of the carbon 
content (orange dots in Figure 12), which is naturally also higher for 
the high-income households. 
                                               
51 The quantity consumed of each food item was calculated as follows: data for 2017 
on the weight (in kilograms) and trade value (in US dollars) of UK food imports were 
sourced from UN Comtrade. The trade value of the imports was converted into GBP 
(using an exchange rate of £1: $1.32357) and divided by the weight of the imports. 
This gives the price (in GBP) per kilogram for each imported food item. Because the 
imported food items do not correspond perfectly to the food items in Figure 10, we 
took a weighted average of the price/kg of the food items from UN Comtrade that 
relate to each food item in Figure 10 (see Table C in the Annex for the HS codes of 
the food items used from UN Comtrade). The resulting price/kg for the food items in 
Figure 4 was divided by the weekly expenditure amounts on each food item by each 
household quintile. This gave the average quantity of CO2 contained in the 
consumption of each food item by each household quintile. Summing up across all 
food items gives the quantity of CO2 contained in the weekly consumption of all food 
items by each household quintile. 
52 We do this for all food items in Figure 10 except for ‘Fruits and vegetables’, due to 
a lack of CO2 intensity data for this item. 
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Figure 12: CO2 content in weekly consumption of selected food 
items by household income quintile 
 
Source: Bruegel based on the Family Food 2016/17 survey of the United Kingdom 
(see Government of the United Kingdom, 2018), FAOSTAT, Hamerschlag and 
Venkat (2011), and UN Comtrade. Note: The value of the CO2 content is calculated 
assuming a carbon price of GBP 20 per tonne. See footnote 16 for a description of 
the methodology. 
 
However, the higher carbon content of the food consumed by higher-
income households is largely driven by higher overall expenditures on 
food. If we examine the share of carbon value in total food 
expenditure of each household type (Figure 13), the shares are 
similar for all household types. The figure suggests that for each 
pound spent on food, high-income households generate as much 
CO2 as low-income households. So, while the general climate-policy 
induced increase in food prices is regressive, the differentiated effects 
of climate policy on the cost of different food items, in our example, 
neither reduce nor exacerbate these distributional effects. 
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Figure 13: Share of the value of food CO2 content in total food 
expenditure by household income quintile 
 
Source: Bruegel based on the Family Food 2016/17 survey of the United Kingdom 
(see Government of the United Kingdom, 2018), FAOSTAT, Hamerschlag and 
Venkat (2011), and UN Comtrade. 
 
It is clear, however, that the results from this simple analysis should 
be interpreted with caution. The distributional effect of regulating 
emissions from agriculture has received little attention in the 
literature, and more research is needed on this topic. The agricultural 
sector will be significantly impacted by both climate change and 
climate policies, which makes it essential for policymakers to 
understand the distributional impacts (if any). A more advanced 
analysis than ours would therefore be valuable. 
2.8 The effect of climate policy on land values 
Climate policies might not only impact the value of coal mines and 
internal combustion engine patents, but also that of land. Land is a 
major asset class primarily owned by high-income households. For 
example, for Germany, Stölzel and Fischer (2018) estimated the 
value of all land at €5.5 trillion, or more than twice as much as the 
market capitalisation of all listed companies in Germany (less than €2 
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trillion in 2017 according to Statista, 2018). Therefore, increases in 
land prices might be regressive. 
2.8.1 Increased land value due to land-demand from renewables 
Both, Carrosio (2013) and Bartoli et al (2016) argued that subsidies 
for maize-fuelled biogas power plants led to a rise in agricultural land 
prices in Italy before a policy change in 2013 that shifted incentives 
towards manure. Nonhebel (2005) showed that biomass energy is the 
most land-intensive of the renewable energy options. She claimed 
that energy supply from biomass is not compatible with food supply 
because of land availability constraints. 
Blanco Foncesca et al (2010) modelled the effect of the EU 2020 
biofuel target on agricultural land use. They found that the target of 10 
percent renewable transport fuel by 2020 would increase agricultural 
land use in the EU by 0.3-0.7 million hectares (less than 0.1 percent 
of total utilised agricultural area in the EU) and global land use by 5.2 
million hectares (0.7 percent of the global total), compared to the 
reference scenario. However, under both the reference scenario and 
the policy scenario, land use in the EU is projected to decline. A study 
by UNCTAD (2009, p. 44ff) presented global scenarios for the year 
2100 where 30 percent of energy demand is met by bioenergy and 
land area used for biomass production is equivalent to 44 percent of 
current agricultural land use in the case without specific climate 
policies, and 63 percent in case of enacted climate policies that aim 
to stabilise atmospheric greenhouse gases. However, because of 
relatively inelastic demand for food, the biomass area will mainly 
replace pasture, and the global crop area would not in either scenario 
be greatly affected by biomass expansion. 
More recent studies have projected low impacts on competition for 
land because second-generation biofuel technologies use waste and 
by-products from food crop production to produce biofuel, and 
because policies are increasingly designed to support the type of 
biofuel production that has the least impact on land competition 
(International Energy Agency, 2017b). 
Evans et al (2009) said that “renewable energy technologies are often 
claimed to compete with agriculturally arable land”. They ranked 
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photovoltaics ahead of geothermal, wind and hydro power in terms of 
intensity of land use. 
2.8.2 Increased land value due to reduction in air and noise pollution 
Chiarazzo et al (2014) studied the impact of environmental quality on 
house prices in urban areas. They find that noise levels are 
negatively correlated with real estate values (and that coefficient is 
statistically significant in their econometric model). Furthermore, they 
find that in regions where air pollution is perceived as a dangerous 
issue (because of the level of air pollution in some areas), air quality 
has a negative effect on property prices. 
Employing a more sophisticated approach Bajari et al (2012) found 
relatively large and statistically significant negative effects of air 
pollution measures on house prices in the California Bay Area 
between 1990 and 2006. As air pollution was reduced during that 
period, this can be interpreted as a proxy for consumers’ willingness 
to pay for increased air quality. 
Thus, decarbonisation might make cheap polluted land into more 
expensive less-polluted land. But this will increase the availability of 
less-polluted land and hence bring down the high mark-up of such 
land. Reducing pollution might therefore even reduce average land 
prices.  
On the other hand, it has been argued that wind turbines in particular 
have adverse effects on residential property values. Vyn (2018) 
explored differences between municipalities that are opposed to wind 
energy developments and others that are not opposed. He finds that 
“wind turbines have negatively impacted property values in ‘unwilling 
host’ municipalities, while no significant impacts are found in 
unopposed municipalities”. 
On aggregate it is likely that climate policies will significantly increase 
the value of land. But we are not aware of studies that analyse either 
the size of this effect or its distributional impacts. 
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2.9 Macro and labour market effects 
2.9.1 Aggregate macro effect of climate policies 
The macroeconomic effects of climate policies on inequality are very 
complex and their net effect is quite difficult to determine.  
From a theoretical perspective, a massive increase in capital 
expenditure resulting from a quick greening of the economy and of its 
capital stock would have a positive direct impact on GDP. However, it 
could also indirectly increase interest rates, which could in turn crowd 
out other investments and thus negatively affect GDP and 
employment. For instance, Förster et al (2012a and 2012b) estimated 
that successfully reducing EU greenhouse gas emissions until 2050 
would require investment equivalent to around 1.5 percent of EU 
GDP per year. This number needs to be compared with the current 
annual level of investment across the EU, which is around 19 percent 
of GDP. However, given the secular decline in the level of interest 
rates across the world, the current level of unused resources and the 
low level of capital expenditure since the Great Recession, this 
potential crowding out effect of climate policies on GDP should not be 
overstated, at least in the near future. More generally, most 
simulations available in the literature consider that the effects via the 
interest rate channel would be limited (also because the effect should 
be moderated by the reduced investment in brown energies and 
because it should be compensated for by the direct effect on GDP of 
increased investment in clean technologies).  
Climate policies (such as higher taxes on energy, or measures to 
promote energy efficiency) should result in a change in patterns of 
consumption of energy and of energy-intensive goods. This reduced 
consumption of energy (as a share of income) might lead to an 
increase in spending in other sectors which could have the opposite 
effect and boost GDP and employment in non-energy sectors, which 
could lead to structural shifts in the economy. In specific sectors that 
are capital rather than labour intensive, such as energy generation, 
there could be a potential positive substitution effect as imported 
energy (ie oil, gas and coal) would be replaced by locally-produced 
renewable energy. This would have an aggregate positive impact on 
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domestic GDP and employment. In addition, measures intended to 
increase energy efficiency (in buildings for example) are generally 
labour intensive and could provide a boost to local labour markets.   
Overall, given these various conflicting channels, the aggregate effect 
of climate policies is difficult to estimate precisely. Nevertheless, 
multiple attempts have been made in the literature, using diverse 
methodologies. Depending on the modelling strategies, the net effect 
estimated in the literature ranges from slightly negative to significantly 
positive. Simulations suggest overall modest aggregate effects on 
GDP and net employment. For instance, Cambridge Econometrics 
(2013) estimated that the 2050 Energy Road Map (European 
Commission, 2011) – setting out a reduction in CO2 emissions of 80-
90 percent from 1990 levels – would increase employment by 
between zero and 1.5 percent compared to a continuation of current 
policies. The effects on GDP would be minor however. One model 
(GEM-E3) predicts an additional increase in GDP of 2 percent to 3 
percent by 2050 on top of the baseline increase of 85 percent, 
whereas another model (E3ME) predicts a reduction in GDP of 1 
percent to 2 percent.  
These insights from modelling exercises are confirmed by case 
studies and empirical analyses. For instance, Markandya et al (2016) 
looked at the employment impact of the EU climate policies 
implemented from 1995 and 2009, and found that they have resulted 
overall in a net increase in employment in the EU of 0.24 percent – a 
positive but very small number. Even though the policies that will 
have to be implemented in the next decades to fight global warming 
effectively need to be more forceful than those put in place so far, 
these numbers are compatible with the predictions obtained through 
the modelling exercises discussed before. 
2.9.2 Effects of climate policies on labour markets 
However, what matters more for the distributional impact of climate 
policies is that, although the aggregate macro effects on GDP or on 
net employment might be small or even negligible, the distributional 
effects through labour market changes might be much greater. Again, 
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we will describe the different channels from a theoretical perspective 
and try to quantify these changes using the literature on this issue. 
Even if the net effect on total employment is small, there could be 
greater distributional effects: 1) from a sectoral perspective, because 
some sectors will be more affected than others by climate policies; 2) 
from a skills perspective, as low-skills brown jobs could be replaced 
by medium- to high-skilled green jobs; and 3) from a spatial 
perspective, because jobs at the local level could be displaced as a 
result of structural changes in the economy resulting from climate 
policies.  
There will be winners and losers from a sectoral point of view. Jobs 
should increase in some sectors as a result of climate policies and 
the decarbonisation of the economy. This should clearly be the case 
in the renewable energy sector, which should see the creation of jobs 
on a permanent basis for the maintenance and operation of 
renewable technologies. This could also be the case in the agriculture 
sector if biofuels/biomass technologies play an important role in the 
decarbonisation process. In addition to permanent jobs, a significant 
number of jobs should also be created during the transition in the 
manufacturing and installation of new renewable technologies. The 
transition towards a low-carbon economy should also benefit 
employment in the construction sector because it will be necessary to 
implement energy-efficiency standards in housing and in buildings 
more generally (see for instance BPIE, 2011). In terms of 
manufacturing, several of the largest companies in the renewable 
energy sector – in terms of global sales – are based in Europe. This 
is visible in positive trade balances, especially in the wind turbine 
manufacturing sector, in which companies based in Denmark, 
Germany and Spain are amongst the most competitive in the World 
(Fragkos et al, 2017) and are building competitive advantages in 
these sectors thanks to specialisation that becomes self-reinforcing 
through a high level of R&D (Kalcik and Zachmann, 2018). If they 
maintain their comparative advantage, these companies should be 
able to employ more workers, given the higher demand for these 
technologies at the global level to fulfil the Paris Agreement 
objectives.  
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However, there will be jobs lost in other sectors. This will be 
particularly the case for power generation using fossil fuels (eg coal 
mines, fossil-fuel power plants, refineries), but will also affect energy-
intensive manufacturing, the transport sector, the equipment sector 
for fossil fuel technologies, and retail sales of fossil fuels (eg gas 
stations). Nevertheless, these job destructions should be more than 
compensated for by the creation of jobs in other sectors. This is the 
case because the renewable energy sector has higher domestic job 
content than the fossil-fuel energy sector (Fragkos et al, 2017).  
Workers’ skill levels, and their flexibility, should thus play a crucial 
role in the transition to a decarbonised economy. Green jobs are very 
different in terms of skills requirements, wage levels and working 
conditions, so it is not clear if the transition towards a low-carbon 
economy will have an impact on the average level of skills needed or 
on job quality in general (see for instance European Foundation for 
the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2012). However, 
jobs will be reallocated within sectors, as some emerging occupations 
will demand new educational requirements. For instance, in the motor 
vehicles industry, the move towards electric and hybrid vehicles, 
combined with the increased sophistication of cars, is likely to lead to 
an increased demand for workers with medium to high skills, such as 
software or electrical engineers. In the construction sector, however, 
there should be increasing demand for low-skilled workers to 
renovate buildings. Nevertheless, even if, in that case, low-skilled 
jobs are created, some reallocation of workers will take place and 
some retraining of the workforce might be necessary, given that the 
skills needed to make buildings energy-efficient tend to be quite 
specific. 
From a spatial point of view, brown jobs destroyed tend to be 
concentrated in certain areas, such as around production site. For 
example, phasing out coal in Europe – and in particular coal mining – 
would lead to direct job losses in this sector. As suggested by 
Tagliapietra (2017), the issue would not be substantial on aggregate: 
the EU country with the highest number of coal mining jobs is Poland, 
with only around 115,500 people employed in coal mines and related 
businesses; second is Germany with only 27,075 people working in 
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this sector. However, these jobs are heavily concentrated (for 
instance in Silesia, where they still represent 5 percent of 
employment) and therefore the negative effects at the local level 
could be significant from the economic and political perspectives, and 
would need to be taken into account by public authorities.  
In practice, these factors mean climate policies will have varying 
effects on the workforce. Overall, model-based predictions suggest 
that the transition to a low-carbon economy should lead to a 
reallocation of 1.3 percent of EU jobs by 2050 (Fragkos and 
Paroussos, 2018, using the GEM-E3 model). This is not negligible, 
but it is not an exceptional number either, especially if you compare it 
with the total job reallocation expected during this period for other 
reasons (for comparison, between 1995 and 2005, the amount of job 
reallocation in OECD countries amounted to 20 percent of 
employment; see OECD, 2017). However, given the specific nature of 
the skills needed, combined with the EU’s low labour mobility, 
between sectors and between geographical areas, the transition 
could result in severe bottlenecks in the economy, which could lead to 
transitional unemployment and to unfilled vacancies. This effect is, 
however, difficult to quantify because the general equilibrium models 
used in this field generally assume that jobs are immediately filled 
and that there are no frictions in job transitions. 
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3  CASE STUDIES 
In the previous section, we mainly discussed the distributional 
impacts of climate policies as stand-alone interventions in ‘laboratory’ 
conditions. And even under such idealised conditions, the results 
were complex and often ambiguous. But real-world climate policies 
are almost never the simple interventions assumed in economic 
models. Policies – such as renewables support schemes or 
emissions trading schemes – contain hundreds of complex provisions 
and exemptions and they happen in a complex world characterised 
by overlapping policies and policy objectives.  
In order to illustrate some aspects of the distributional effects of 
current climate policies, we provide case studies on two main 
elements of EU climate policy:  
(1) The design of the electricity market, and  
(2) The EU emissions trading system (ETS).  
Climate policies are rapidly transforming the electricity sector. 
Electrification of transport and heating is expected to result in greater 
electricity demand, while decarbonisation of the electricity sector will 
require a system that reliably accommodates very high shares of 
electricity from wind, solar and other renewable sources. Already 
today, market design choices have a substantial impact on 
consumers. In Germany alone, explicit support programmes for 
renewable energies cost consumers €24 billion in 2017 
(Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie , 2017).  
The EU emissions trading system is a key policy tool to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions from industrial firms and utilities. It is the 
world’s largest cap-and-trade system and a model for other 
greenhouse gas emissions trading systems. The 2017 turnover of the 
ETS was about €10 billion53. 
                                               
53 1.8 billion allowances used in 2017 multiplied by an average price of €5.7 per 
allowance. 
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3.1 Case study: electricity market design 
Investment and operation decisions in many sectors that need to 
decarbonise are strongly driven by regulatory decisions. High-emitting 
sectors such as the energy and transport sectors are heavily 
regulated. In Europe, complex rules were established to allow 
competing companies to offer electricity, gas, postal services or rail 
transportation to final consumers54. However, the incentives these 
companies have to invest are largely shaped by administratively-set 
sector rules. We will focus here on the electricity sector, as electricity 
is assumed to play a key role in decarbonisation. 
It is likely that power generation will be largely decarbonised by the 
middle of the century, while heat and transport might be electrified. To 
do this in an efficient way, electricity sector regulation will matter a lot, 
as investment and operational decisions in this sector are strongly 
driven by regulatory decisions. For example, energy regulators have 
to approve the investment programmes of electricity network 
operators and decide on these projects’ rates of return. Meanwhile, 
power-generation companies, for example, base their investment and 
operational decisions on an administratively-established market 
design. This market design sets requirements for products and the 
market participants that are allowed to buy and sell them. For 
example, capacity markets might require the transmission system 
operator to procure the right to ask for additional generation from 
eligible providers55. Depending on the detailed rules, these markets 
favour one solution over another (eg batteries, gas-fired power plants 
or demand response). Thus, the final price paid by electricity 
consumers is not the result of simple competition between electricity 
companies, but rather the outcome of a complex mixture of regulated 
payment streams to different participants.  
                                               
54 Those rules were necessary as these sectors are network industries with a natural 
tendency towards monopolisation. 
55 Some regulatory decisions reduce competition (eg by narrowly defining the 
technical criteria for capacity-products so that only few companies can provide them), 
and thus result in higher prices. 
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3.1.1 Status quo 
Currently, the rules governing the functioning of the electricity sector 
have substantial distributional consequences. This is illustrated by the 
very different electricity prices paid by different consumer groups in 
different regions, and by the share of the price that goes to different 
industrial segments. 
Prices for different consumer groups vary widely – depending 
on national tariff design 
Households in the EU typically pay around 76 percent more than 
industry per kilowatt hour (kWh). Households with low power 
consumption pay 69 percent more per kWh than households with 
high power consumption (Table 6). There is some economic rationale 
for this. Industrial consumers are easier to serve, as they do not 
require low-voltage connections and have less-volatile load profiles. 
In addition, the share of the fixed-cost components (network 
connection, metering and billing) is relatively greater for low-
consumption households. 
However, the role of market design in distributing costs between 
various consumer groups also matters, as illustrated by the different 
ratios in different EU countries (Table 6, column 1). While households 
pay less than industrial consumers per kWh in Malta, they pay 50 
percent more than industrial consumers in Italy, twice as much in 
Austria and more than three times as much in Denmark. 
The difference in retail tariffs for typical low-income households with 
low electricity consumption, and typical high-income households with 
high consumption, is also highly dependent on the market design and 
differs widely in different countries (Table 6, column 2). While small 
households (with an annual consumption below 1,000 kWh) pay less 
per kWh than large households (annual consumption above 15,000 
kWh) in Malta, small households pay 68 percent more in Germany, 
about twice as much in Slovakia and more than three times as much 
in Spain. 
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Table 6: Ratio of household to industry retail electricity price 
(2016 Semester 2; price incl. taxes and levies) 
  
(1) Medium 
household/industry 
(2) Small 
household/large 
household 
Austria 2.00 2.47 
Belgium 2.37 2.23 
Bulgaria 1.19 1.04 
Cyprus 1.25 1.20 
Croatia 1.52 1.69 
Czech Republic 1.94 2.58 
Denmark 3.30 1.75 
Estonia 1.38 1.16 
Finland 2.23 2.81 
France 1.89 1.89 
Germany 2.00 1.68 
Greece 1.55 1.04 
Hungary 1.41 1.13 
Ireland 1.88 2.67 
Italy 1.50 1.20 
Latvia 1.35 1.17 
Lithuania 1.33 1.14 
Luxembourg 1.98 1.60 
Malta 0.91 0.92 
Netherlands 1.98 1.76 
Poland 1.66 1.31 
Portugal 2.03 1.83 
Romania 1.60 1.08 
Slovakia 1.38 2.19 
Slovenia 1.96 1.47 
Spain 2.22 3.02 
Sweden 2.99 2.60 
United Kingdom 1.43 1.71 
EU average 1.76 1.69 
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Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat. Notes: Small household = annual consumption 
below 1,000 kWh; Medium household = annual consumption between 2,500 kWh 
and 5,000 kWh; Large household = annual consumption above 15,000 kWh; and 
Industry = annual consumption between 500 and 2,000 MWh. 
 
The stark national differences in the sharing of electricity costs 
between different consumer groups arise partly from the composition 
of retail tariffs (Figure 14). There are major differences between 
countries. Energy and supply cost ranges from 13 percent (Denmark) 
to 78 percent (Malta). Taxes and levies (eg for renewables) make up 
more than 50 percent of the price in Denmark and Germany, but less 
than 20 percent in five countries. The share of network costs is fairly 
similar for all countries at about 30 percent. That is, in some 
countries, the unregulated components (energy and supply costs) 
account for the greatest share of the retail tariff, while in others, the 
share of the regulated components (taxes and levies) is greater.  
Figure 14: Share of each component in the electricity price 
(medium households, 2016) 
 
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat. 
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Regionalisation of electricity prices – a policy choice 
There can be significant regional variation in electricity costs. First, 
instead of constructing additional transmission lines and incurring 
transmission losses to bring electricity to distant regions, it is cheaper 
to use electricity where it is produced. Because of such economic 
cost considerations, some countries allow wholesale prices to differ 
by region (eg Italy; see Figure 15), while others do not (eg Germany 
and France). 
Second, bringing electricity to households in rural areas is typically 
costlier than supplying consumers in more densely populated areas. 
In urban areas, more consumers can be served by a less-extensive 
network. Consequently, some countries allow different regional retail 
tariffs (eg Germany; see Figure 16) , while retail prices are similar for 
all consumers in other EU countries. 
Figure 15: Average wholesale electricity price in Italian bidding 
zones in €/MWh in 2017 
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Source: Bruegel based on Terna (2017). Note: Wholesale prices shown. 
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Figure 16: Monthly electricity costs (€) for German households 
(using the price of the cheapest supplier) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Heidjann (2018). Note: The figure shows the electricity costs per month for 
1,437 locations in Germany. The costs are calculated assuming an annual 
consumption of 3,500 kWh and the price in the beginning of May 2018. 
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Domestic prices increase faster than industrial prices in 
Germany 
Over the past decade, industry in Germany paid three to four times 
the wholesale price for electricity, with this ratio remaining largely 
stable. In the same period, the price paid by households rose from 
about five times the wholesale price to about eight times the 
wholesale price (Figure 17). In other words, household prices 
decoupled more and more from the value of electricity determined by 
the market, and became more and more driven by higher network 
costs, taxes and levies. 
This finding can be largely explained by the German renewables 
policy. While households have to pay increasing renewables levies 
(currently 6.79 eurocents/kWh) and network costs, many industrial 
consumers are partly exempted from both. At the same time, the 
increasing feed-in of renewables reduces the wholesale market price 
for renewables. This again illustrates how market design choices in 
the electricity sector are already having observable distributional 
consequences. 
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Figure 17: Ratio of retail prices to wholesale price for large 
households (orange) and for large industry (yellow) 
 
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat and Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy 
Systems ISE (2018). Note: S1 refers to the average price across the first 6 months of 
the year; S2 refers to the average price across the last 6 months of the year. Large 
household = annual consumption above 15,000 kWh; and Large industry = annual 
consumption between 70,000 MWh and 150,000 MWh. 
 
3.1.2 Impact of future climate policies on electricity prices and 
inequality 
The European Commission’s EU Reference Scenario 2016 (Capros 
et al, 2016) projects future electricity prices under currently adopted 
EU climate policies, including the 2020 greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction and renewable energy targets 56 . The projections are 
                                               
56 The projections do not take into account the 2030 Energy and Climate policy 
framework. 
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undertaken using PRIMES57 modelling. Average electricity prices are 
projected to increase by 13 percent between 2010 and 2020 and by 
around 20 percent by 2050. The burden would be mostly borne by 
households and services, as their electricity prices increase between 
2010 and 2050. Prices for industry, on the other hand, would remain 
fairly constant, reflecting their base-load profile and the small fraction 
of grid costs and taxes borne by industry.  
Decarbonisation will change the requirements of the electricity system 
and hence the market arrangements will need to change. A cost-
optimal approach can be highly regressive. We could see three 
trends: (1) connection payments increase; (2) electricity prices 
become more volatile; and (3) electricity provision might become 
more decentralised.  
(1) Connection payments increase  
Higher shares of renewables might lead to lower prices for the energy 
delivered (ie the kWh), as the system is overbuilt to ensure enough 
capacity is available when the sun does not shine and the wind does 
not blow. Hence, most of the time there would be excess generation 
capacities available, which would translate into low prices for the 
energy delivered. At the same time, we can expect the capacity part 
of the bill, ie the monthly connection charge, to go up because 
renewables require back-up capacities for the time when the wind is 
not blowing and the sun is not shining. This can either be financed 
through massive price spikes in times of scarcity (see the next sub-
section) or through separate payments for capacity 58 . Capacity 
payments would typically be charged on the connection fee.  
At the same time, higher shares of renewables will require more and 
smarter electricity networks in order to manage the increasing 
fluctuations. The network cost should ideally also be put on the 
connection charge, and not on the energy charge. 
                                               
57 PRIMES: Price-Induced Market Equilibrium System. 
58 Both approaches currently exist in parallel in the EU. 
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This shift from energy to capacity payments can be regressive, 
especially when the connection fee does not depend on the individual 
consumer’s peak consumption. In this case, high-income households 
with typically higher electricity consumption and higher peak load 
would pay the same price as low-income households, with typically 
lower electricity consumption and lower peak load. 
(2) Increasing volatility 
With high shares of volatile renewables, the price per MWh on the 
wholesale market will become more and more volatile. If the market 
design permits, it would be efficient for this volatility to be passed 
through to consumers, so that they could respond by adjusting their 
consumption. But the corresponding investment in a smart meter 
would only be profitable for households with sufficiently large energy 
consumption, appliances that can adapt to different price patterns (eg 
heat pumps) and low time preference – in other words, high-income 
households. Such households could then benefit from lower prices at 
specific times by, for example, charging their electric vehicles or 
generating heating/cooling. 
(3) Decentralisation 
Some low carbon technologies can be deployed in a very 
decentralised manner. Rooftop solar59 and micro-cogeneration plants 
for electricity generation, thermal energy storage systems and 
batteries for storage or heat pumps for heating, can all be deployed at 
small scale. In combination, these technologies allow household or 
communities to choose how they want to interact with the electricity 
system (or even to entirely decouple). This can be desirable as more 
local generation and local flexibility can reduce the need to extend 
distribution networks.  
Network pricing, electricity taxation and specific leverages for 
renewables in most countries make all households pay depending on 
                                               
59 According to Ecofys, 73 percent of German installed PV capacity was below 100 
kW. 
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their consumption from the grid. Allowing households that can afford 
a capital-intensive autonomous system to opt-out from the system – 
eg through self-consumption that is not subject to taxes, leverages or 
network costs – will have distributional consequences. Low-income 
and urban households will have to compensate for this shortfall of 
income from households that were able to invest in the 
aforementioned technologies. 
(4) Merit-order effect 
The shift towards more renewables also has distributional 
implications arising from the so-called ‘merit-order’ effect. In 
wholesale electricity markets, the price is determined by the 
intersection of the merit-order (supply) and demand curves 60 . As 
Figure 18 shows for a hypothetical electricity market, the merit-order 
curve is composed of various energy sources that differ in their 
production costs. Renewables generate electricity at virtually zero 
cost while coal and gas power plants are more expensive. The costs 
of the various technologies are depicted in Figure 18 by the height of 
the bars. The price is equal to P1  and is determined by the 
intersection of the supply and demand curves. All units of electricity 
that can be produced at a cost below or equal to this price are sold. 
Figure 19 shows the effect of increased production from renewables. 
The supply of electricity increases, shifting the merit-order curve to 
the right. Because the electricity from the additional renewables is so 
cheap, the renewables ‘crowd out’, or replace, more expensive power 
plants. The associated fall in the price is known as the merit-order 
effect. 
  
                                               
60 The price can be said to equal the cost of supplying the last unit of electricity to 
meet demand. 
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Figure 18: A hypothetical wholesale electricity market  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Source: Bruegel. 
Figure 1: The merit-order effect 
 
Figure 19: The merit-order effect 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bruegel. 
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The merit-order effect has been widely observed in practice. Ray et al 
(2010) conducted a literature review on the impact of the increased 
penetration of wind power in European electricity markets. They 
concluded that most studies find a negative effect on wholesale 
prices. Figure 20 is replicated from Ray et al (2010) and shows the 
results of four of the studies. 
Figure 20: Empirical findings on the reduction in the wholesale 
electricity price resulting from an increased supply of wind 
power in Belgium, Denmark and Germany 
 
Source: Ray et al (2010). 
 
Decreasing wholesale prices can translate into lower retail prices for 
consumers. However, it is unclear whether all consumer classes (eg 
households, firms) benefit equally. While electricity-intensive firms 
might pay less, household prices might remain unchanged if 
households bear the cost of integrating more renewables. This could 
occur if renewable support schemes are financed through mark-ups 
on the household price. Electricity-intensive firms, on the other hand, 
might be exempt from the price mark-up, implying that they pay less 
for electricity (Cludius, 2015). This suggests that there could be 
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transfers between consumer groups when renewables are added to 
the electricity mix, as a result of the cost of renewable support 
schemes being borne solely by households.  
Currently, however, such distributional effects are rarely quantified 
and addressed in the public discourse on regulatory changes.  
3.2 Case study: market design of the EU ETS 
The EU emissions trading system (EU ETS) is a core component of 
the EU’s climate policy, covering more than 11,000 firms in the 
European Economic Area (EEA). The design of the EU ETS has a 
number of distributional implications. In particular, the EU ETS has 
led to a transfer of wealth from governments and households to the 
private sector. Below, we provide a brief overview of the EU ETS and 
then outline three major channels through which wealth has been 
transmitted. We conclude by summarising the overall distributional 
impact of the EU ETS and by highlighting the role of governments in 
redistributing wealth to consumers. 
3.2.1 Overview of the EU ETS 
Launched in 2005, the EU ETS covers around 45 percent of the 
EEA’s greenhouse gas emissions. Industrial installations and power 
plants that participate in the EU ETS must surrender an allowance for 
every tonne of emissions generated. These allowances can be traded 
among participants, giving firms an incentive to reduce emissions if 
the allowance price exceeds the marginal abatement cost. A system-
wide ‘cap’ (or limit) is placed on the overall number of allowances in 
the EU ETS. The cap is reduced over time to reduce total emissions. 
The EU ETS is currently in its third trading phase (2013-2020) and a 
fourth phase is scheduled for 2021-2030.  
Allowances are distributed in two ways: by auctioning and free 
allocation. The power sector purchases all of its allowances in 
auctions, and therefore does not receive any allowances for free. The 
industrial sector was allocated 80 percent of its allowances for free in 
2013; this share is expected to decrease to 30 percent by 2020. 
However, some industrial installations with significant energy costs 
receive all of their allowances for free. 
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The EU ETS has led to a transfer of wealth from governments and 
households to firms through three channels: creating low-cost 
allowances based on international projects, the allocation of free 
allowances and indirect cost compensation for electricity-intensive 
firms.  
3.2.2 Channel 1: Private-sector seigniorage from international credits  
Firms in the EU ETS can use international credits for compliance. 
Firms can obtain these credits either by investing in projects that 
reduce emissions in developing countries (Clean Development 
Mechanism credits) or by paying for projects that reduce emissions in 
other developed countries (Joint Implementation credits). The credits 
are cheaper than EU ETS allowances and, as such, firms have used 
them for compliance and sold any excess of freely obtained 
allowances on the EU ETS market. De Bruyn et al (2016) estimated 
that the availability of cheaper credits was highly beneficial for firms, 
and increased profits in 15 sectors in 19 EU countries by more than 
€630 million between 2008 and 2012. However, this possibility has 
been significantly reduced since 2013. International credits can no 
longer be used as compliance units in Phase 3 of the EU ETS. 
Instead, operators must exchange them for EU allowances, up to 
their individual cap, as set in the registry. 
3.2.3 Channel 2: Allocation of free allowances  
To safeguard their international competitiveness, manufacturing 
sectors receive a number of allowances for free, based on a relatively 
complex allocation scheme. Although free allowances encourage 
companies to remain in Europe, their issuance has distributional 
consequences. In particular, over-allocation of free allowances and 
the pass-through of their value in product prices have generated 
additional profits for firms at the expense of governments and 
consumers. 
2a) Over-allocation of free allowances  
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European industry has benefited from the over-allocation of free 
allowances. Between 2008 and 2014, industrial firms (excluding those 
burning fuels 61 ) received about 3.5 billion allowances for free, 
although about four-fifths of this amount would have covered their 
emissions62. Firms can sell their surplus allowances at a profit or use 
them for compliance at a later date. De Bruyn et al (2016) estimated 
that the over-allocation generated additional profits of more than €8 
billion from 2008-14. Governments, in turn, have foregone revenue 
since the surplus allowances could have been auctioned. The over-
allocation of free allowances can thus be considered a shift of wealth 
from governments to firms. 
The design of the EU ETS was revised for phase 3 to reduce the 
over-allocation of free allowances. In contrast to phase 2, for which 
the allocation was determined by historical emissions, phase 3 uses a 
benchmarking approach that bases the allocation level on 
installations’ emissions intensity. Efficient installations that generate 
low emissions relative to their output levels, receive most or all 
allowances for free, while less-efficient firms must either reduce 
emissions or purchase some of their allowances. In addition, a ‘cross-
sectoral correction factor’ ensures that the number of free allowances 
remains below the emissions cap for industrial installations. 
2b) Pass-through of the opportunity cost of free allowances 
Firms have largely passed through the value of the allowances they 
used – irrespective of whether they received them for free or had to 
buy them – into product prices. The rationale is that, for all 
allowances, firms can sell them on the market or use them to comply 
with the EU ETS. Economic theory suggests that firms only use free 
allowances for compliance if they can recover the ‘opportunity cost’, 
                                               
61 Firms categorised under ‘Combustion of fuels’ in the EU Transaction Log, from 
which the emissions data for the analysis is sourced, are excluded because they 
comprise electricity producers not receiving any free allowances. 
62 The calculation is based on data from the European Environment Agency’s EU 
ETS data viewer, available at: https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-
maps/dashboards/emissions-trading-viewer-1. 
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which is the money foregone from not selling the allowances on the 
EU ETS market. Firms can recover the opportunity cost by increasing 
product prices by the market value of their used allowances. The 
carbon cost63 would therefore be ‘passed-through’ into product prices. 
If such pass-through is possible, the allocation of free allowances can 
be considered a transfer of wealth from consumers to firms. 
In practice, the degree of cost pass-through is considerable. Table 7 
shows the estimated pass-through rates in six major sectors covered 
by the EU ETS, sourced from De Bruyn et al (2015). Between 2008 
and 2014, about 60 percent of the products investigated by the report 
had positive pass-through rates. Some firms transmitted more than 
100 percent of the carbon costs, implying significant price increases 
for consumers. 
Table 7: Estimated cost-pass through (CPT) rates for various 
products 
Sector Product CPT rates from De 
Bruyn et al (2015)* 
Cement Clinker 35-40% 
  Portland cement** 90-100% 
  Total cement 20-40% 
Fertiliser Fertiliser and nitrogen 
compounds** >100% 
Glass Fibre glass NA 
  Hollow and other glass** 40->100% 
Iron and steel Flat products** 55->100% 
Petrochemicals Ethylene >100% 
  Mono ethylene glycol NA 
  Propylene oxide ≈100% 
                                               
63 In the case of free allowances, the ‘carbon cost’ refers to the opportunity cost of 
the allowances, equal to their market value. This is the price that other firms must 
pay to acquire a free allowance on the market. Similarly, in the case of auctioned 
allowances, the ‘carbon cost’ is the cost of purchasing an allowance at auction. 
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  Propylene glycol ether >100% 
  Methanol, Butadiene, 
Propylene NA 
Refineries Diesel** >100% 
  Gasoil >100% 
  Petrol** 80-95% 
Source: Bruegel based on De Bruyn et al (2015) and De Bruyn et al (2016). Note: 
*The CPT rates in the column are those from the empirical analysis of De Bruyn et al 
(2015). They represent the average estimates of the percentage of carbon costs 
passed through in product prices for the cases when the CPT was statistically greater 
than zero (using a 10 percent significance threshold level). 'NA' indicates that no 
significant CPT was found by De Bruyn et al (2015). **Positive CPT rates were also 
found for these products in the literature (see De Bruyn et al, 2016, which 
summarises the CPT rates found in the literature, on the basis of a literature review 
by De Bruyn et al, 2015). 
 
The pass-through of the value of free allowances has distributional 
consequences. Firms acquire free allowances at zero cost, yet 
incorporate some of their value in product prices. This means that 
consumers pay more while firms generate higher profits. In fact, 
European industry may have increased tis profits by more than €15 
billion between 2008 and 2014 by passing through a share of the 
opportunity cost of free allowances into product prices (De Bruyn et 
al, 2016).  
3.2.4 Channel 3: Indirect-cost compensation for electricity-intensive 
firms  
Compensation for ‘indirect costs’ is another channel through which 
wealth is transferred from governments to firms. The EU ETS has 
raised the costs of electricity-intensive firms, because electricity 
producers must purchase allowances. As electricity producers largely 
pass through the compliance costs into prices, firms using electricity 
as an input incur ‘indirect costs’ from the EU ETS by paying more for 
electricity. The indirect costs are substantial for electricity-intensive 
firms and, as such, some EU countries compensate them with 
auctioning revenues. About one third of member states have 
compensation schemes in place, though the level of compensation 
varies. In 2016, France, for instance, used 60 percent of auction 
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revenues for compensation, while slightly above 30 percent was used 
in Germany and the Netherlands. The corresponding share in Greece 
was only about three percent (Marcu et al, 2018). 
3.2.5 Overall distributional effects of the EU ETS 
Figure 21 shows a simplified picture of the overall distributional 
impact of the EU ETS. The figure describes the monetary flows 
between consumers, firms and the government in phase 3, using 
allowance quantity and price data for 2013-17. For simplicity, a cost 
pass-through rate of 90 percent is assumed64 and governments are 
assumed to transmit 34 percent of their auctioning revenues as 
compensation for electricity-intensive firms 65 . These assumptions 
might not hold in practice, but Figure 21 is merely intended to provide 
a rough indication of the transmission of wealth in the EU ETS.  
  
                                               
64 The cost pass-through rate in the power sector is likely to be close to 100 percent. 
For industrial installations, the rates range from zero to above 100 percent (De Bruyn 
et al, 2015). An average rate of 90 percent is thus assumed for simplicity.  
65 34 percent was the share of indirect cost compensation in auctioning revenue in 
Germany in 2016 (Marcu et al, 2018). 
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Figure 21: A simplified picture of the monetary flows in the EU 
ETS (2013-17) 
Source: Bruegel based on European Environment Agency data, available at: 
https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/dashboards/emissions-trading-viewer-1. 
*Note: The indirect cost compensation is directed towards electricity-intensive firms. 
‘Firms’ include all stationary installations in the EU ETS (ie in both the EU and the 
EEA) in phase 3. 
 
The EU ETS is therefore not only regressive on the household-
expenditure side (carbon cost being passed through to products that 
make up a greater share in the consumption basket of low-income 
households) but also on the government side – with a compensation 
mechanism that benefits capital owning households. On the income 
side, the ETS reduces the (net of free allowances) value and wages 
of emitting companies, but increases the value and wages of 
companies that produce substitutes. This effect is likely to be 
progressive. The total distributional effect of the ETS has never been 
quantified, but should be slightly regressive in our view. A 
comprehensive analysis in the distributional effects of such a 
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significant instrument (with a turnover of up to €40 billion per year)66 
is clearly warranted. 
  
                                               
66 1.9 billion allowances were issued in 2018 and the current price (October 2018) is 
around €20 per allowance. 
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4  NON-ACTION 
If not addressed, climate change will impair many livelihoods. Not 
everyone will be equally affected by climate change though, as those 
already at a disadvantage will be more likely to suffer harm. The 
disadvantage can stem from a lower socioeconomic status, 
demographic characteristics, weak political power, or inferior access 
to public resources (Islam and Winkel, 2017). For instance, there is 
evidence from Australia that rural male farmers are more prone to 
suicide during droughts (Hanigan et al, 2012). Moreover, low-income 
households might face relatively greater financial losses from 
hurricanes (Leichenko and Silva, 2014). In this chapter, we discuss 
why disadvantaged groups in developed countries 67  might be 
disproportionately hurt by climate change. 
Disadvantaged groups suffer disproportionately from climate change 
because they are more exposed to the adverse effects. Their greater 
exposure arises partly from their housing location. Low-income 
households might, for instance, live in areas at risk of flooding 
because housing is cheaper there. Moreover, in a given area, the 
exposure can be greater for certain occupations. Those working 
outdoors can, for example, be more prone to heat-related stress if 
temperatures rise (Hallegatte et al, 2016; Graff Zivin and Neidell, 
2014). Various inequalities between groups can also interact, further 
exacerbating differences in the exposure level. Mutter (2015) shows 
that a combination of economic and racial factors left African 
Americans in New Orleans especially vulnerable to Hurricane Katrina. 
For a given level of exposure, disadvantaged groups are also more 
vulnerable to the damage caused by the adverse effects of climate 
change. For example, in areas prone to flooding, low-income 
households might be especially susceptible to flood damage if their 
houses are made of less durable material (Islam and Winkel, 2017). 
Differences in vulnerability are rarely due to a single cause, but rather 
                                               
67 Though we focus our attention on developed countries, the messages in this 
section are also relevant in the context of developing countries. 
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Inequalities 
Increased exposure of 
disadvantaged groups 
to climate hazards 
Increased 
vulnerability of 
disadvantaged groups 
to climate hazards 
 
Lower ability of 
disadvantaged groups 
to cope with and 
recover from climate 
hazard damage 
Disproportionate 
harm of 
disadvantaged 
groups 
Climate hazard (eg 
flooding) induced 
by climate change 
to a combination of various inequalities. For instance, discrimination 
based on race can increase income disparities, which can translate 
into differences in vulnerability (IPCC, 2014).  
Disadvantaged groups might also be less able to cope and recover 
from the damage caused by climate hazards. Hurricane victims with 
low incomes might not be able to afford insurance and might 
therefore receive little compensation for destruction of their property. 
This reduced ability to cope and recover can in turn aggravate 
existing inequalities and make the disadvantaged even worse off 
(Figure 22).  
Figure 22: The vicious cycle between climate change and 
inequalities 
 
 
    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bruegel based on Islam and Winkel (2017). 
 
While sections 2 and 3 showed that many climate policies can have 
adverse distributional effects, non-action cannot be the answer. Non-
action would not only make everybody worse off, it would actually 
also affect low-income households more than high-income 
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households. There is thus no trade-off between climate and equity, 
but the question is how climate policies should be designed to 
minimise adverse distributional effects. We discuss this in chapter 5. 
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5  REMEDIES 
Chapter 4 showed that the distributional consequences of climate 
policies might be significant. Economically-efficient policies such as 
emissions standards for cars, renewables support financed through 
levies on households’ electricity consumption or carbon pricing for 
heating fuels might disproportionately affect less-wealthy households, 
increasing inequality in society. But if policymakers are concerned 
about distributional consequences – which they should be (see 
chapter 1) – they do not have to discard effective climate polices. The 
distributional effects of many effective climate policies can be 
remedied by: (i) compensating lower-income households; (ii) 
designing the specific policy measures in a way that reduces the 
distributional effects; and (iii) introducing climate policies that have 
progressive features. This chapter provides some examples. 
5.1 Compensation 
There is a long-standing discussion about the regressive nature of 
carbon taxes (see chapter 2). Most research shows that using carbon 
taxes to compensate low-income households could entirely do away 
with the regressive effects. Governments could in theory compensate 
households for the pass-through by redistributing to them part of their 
auctioning revenues. Compensation might be especially important for 
lower-income households, which might be most hurt by the pass-
through of carbon costs. Figure 23 shows the impact of the pass-
through on households by expenditure level68. As shown in the figure, 
households in the lowest expenditure decile incurred additional costs 
of 1.1 percent of expenditure, compared to 0.5 percent for 
households in the highest decile. Cludius (2015) evaluates two ways 
in which the government could compensate households using its 
auctioning revenues: redistributing the revenues as lump-sum rebates 
or as a reduction in social security contributions. As shown in Figure 
23, lump-sum rebates (green bars) more than offset the additional 
                                               
68 Sourced from Cludius (2015), who estimated the impact of the cost pass-through 
from electricity generating firms using German household data from 2013. 
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costs faced by lower expenditure households. For higher-income 
households, reducing social security contributions (red and white 
striped bars) appears more effective. 
Figure 23: Impact of the EU ETS and revenue redistribution by 
household expenditure decile 
 
Source: Cludius (2015). Note: SCC = social security contributions. 
 
Such compensation can take different forms: 
• Lump-sum transfers (ie fixed sums to each household) benefit 
low-income households for which such a transfer represents a 
higher share of income, compared to higher-income households. 
On the other hand, such transfers are expensive and it looks 
counterintuitive to also compensate high-income households. In 
practice, such lump-sum transfers are very rare. 
• Social policies, such as targeted transfers to the households 
most in need. This can be a very effective way to compensate for 
the regressive effects of climate policies. The difficulty is to design 
(or use an existing scheme) that reliably targets the most affected 
households while not creating perverse incentives. If, for example, 
only households below a certain minimum income level receive a 
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transfer, households close to this threshold might have an 
incentive to reduce their incomes in order to obtain the transfer. 
On the other hand, if – in order to avoid such effects – the 
scheme becomes too complicated69, less-affluent households in 
particular might be less able to participate. 
• Reducing other regressive taxes, such as VAT, or increasing 
allowances for labour taxes, might compensate low-income 
households for the regressive effects of climate policies. But 
changing taxes might also change incentives. If, for example, VAT 
on electricity is reduced, it might incentivise higher consumption.  
• Using income for low-carbon investment that primarily 
benefits less-wealthy households (see section 3.3). 
• Facilitate the transition towards new jobs. The transitional 
issue related to climate change is not very different to the 
challenges from globalisation or technological change, so the 
solution could be the same: if a change in the demand for skills is 
quick, there is a role to play for authorities to ensure that the 
workforce (and in particular displaced workers with low skills) can 
be retrained successfully and quickly. Claeys and Sapir (2018) 
and Tagliapietra (2017) proposed to broaden the scope of the 
European Globabilisation Adjustment Fund to put in place active 
labour market policies in the EU to help workers who have lost 
their jobs as a result of the implementation of climate policies.  
One additional issue is that the aforementioned compensation 
policies are already a very crowded policy space. It is thus difficult to 
attribute individual compensation measures to individual regressive 
policies – whose regressive nature might also change over time.  
Given the real-world complexities of getting compensation schemes 
right so that they exactly offsets the regressive effect for each 
household in a way that does not distort incentives and does not 
                                               
69 For example, if households need to submit proof of income, assets and costs going 
back many years. 
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over-extend fiscal budgets is impossible. So policymakers will be 
faced with a trade-off. This might be best addressed by a combination 
of measures and continued monitoring of the actual regressive effects 
of climate polices and an evaluation of the compensation schemes. 
In the long-term, another issue will arise. After a certain point in time 
emissions, will likely fall faster than carbon prices will increase. 
Government revenues from carbon taxes will then start to fall, 
shrinking the space for recycling of revenues70.   
5.2 Design less-regressive policies 
A second approach would be to design policies in a way that their 
burden is proportionate to the income of the affected households. In 
many cases, addressing distributional effects in the design of policies 
will have some impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
climate policies. 
Focus on less-regressive sectors first. We described how climate 
policies for different products/services have different distributional 
impacts. In order to reduce the regressive effects, climate 
policymakers might prioritise the least regressive elements. For 
example, putting high prices on carbon in transport, especially 
aviation, will have less dramatic distributional consequences than a 
similar price for heating or electricity.  
Focus on less-regressive policy tools. A sector can be 
decarbonised using different policy instruments. And some policy 
instruments are more regressive than others. Policy choices should 
therefore not only be concerned by effectiveness and efficiency 
considerations, but should also take account of distributional aspects. 
In the discussion on taxes versus technology standards, distributional 
concerns typically provide an additional argument for the former.  
                                               
70 Assuming a back-stop technology such as CCS becomes competitive with the 
carbon tax (eg, at €100/tonne) the money spent by consumers on removing 
emissions using such technologies will not be available as tax income that can be 
used for recycling. 
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Renewable support schemes. As discussed in section 3.1, 
renewable support schemes that are financed through a levy on the 
electricity price are regressive. If industrial consumers are exempted 
and only higher-income households can benefit from support 
schemes, this effect is exacerbated. A number of design elements 
can reduce the regressive effects. If some of the renewables support 
can be financed from taxes or levies on a basis that is more 
correlated with income (eg electricity consumption above a certain 
per-capita allowance), it could significantly reduce the regressive 
nature of the support. Making systems more efficient and competitive 
(eg through auctioning approaches) can reduce the excess profit 
potential for higher-income households and reduce the cost for lower-
income households. Finally, by including industrial consumers in the 
schemes, the cost could be spread much more widely – reducing the 
burden on lower-income households. Any reform has to deal with the 
complexity and path dependency of renewables support schemes71 
and the difficult political trade-offs (support for industry versus support 
for low-income households). It might therefore be more important to 
spend political capital to come up with as-fair-as-possible future 
schemes, than to reform less-fair existing schemes, which are being 
(and should be) phased-out. 
The EU ETS puts a price on carbon that might have to rise 
substantially if the EU wants to meet its decarbonisation ambition. As 
discussed in section 3.2, the ETS is designed in a very regressive 
way by exempting/compensating industrial users and passing through 
the cost to households. Some of the compensation (free allowances) 
is supposed to be phased out over time – but interest groups are 
trying to prevent this. One way to reduce the regressive nature would 
be to give a certain share of free allowances to households on a per-
capita basis (ie a lump sum that is indexed to the carbon price). 
Alternatively, protection against carbon leakage could be organised 
                                               
71 The German main renewables support scheme law (Erneuerbaren Energien 
Gesetz) text currently has 134 pages and has undergone major reforms every three 
or four years since the year 2000. 
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through some form of border adjustment72 so that all allowances can 
be auctioned. This, however, would be highly complex. 
Climate diplomacy to mitigate the competitiveness versus 
equality trade-off. One recurring theme when discussing 
distributional effects is the efficiency-equity trade-off, or the choice 
between having a larger cake or a more equally-shared cake. In 
particular, when faced with international competitors that conduct 
less-aggressive climate policies, putting the costs of decarbonisation 
onto capital and skilled labour might encourage those crucial 
production factors to leave. Putting the cost onto those economic 
actors that find it more difficult to leave – consumers – allows for 
more aggressive climate policies. This even holds for compensation, 
because the corresponding resources need to be generated through 
distorting taxation. We would argue that – if more attention were paid 
on this – it would be possible to design policies with less distributional 
effects. But at some point, the efficiency-equity trade-off will kick in. 
Thus, it is the role of climate diplomacy to ensure that global climate 
policies are somewhat synchronised to avoid this trade-off. 
5.3 Allow the benefits of climate policies to go to the least 
wealthy 
Section 2 showed that subsidies for private investments in low-carbon 
assets (eg electric vehicles or solar panels) are highly regressive. On 
the other hand, public low-carbon investment that primarily benefits 
low-income households could reduce inequality. Examples include 
public programmes to increase the energy efficiency of public housing 
or to improve public transport. The same can hold for investment 
support programmes targeted at low-income households, such as the 
US Department of Energy’s Weatherization Assistance Program, 
                                               
72 Many proposals imply taxing the imported carbon content of products and 
exempting the exported carbon content from the ETS. 
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which deploys energy efficiency improvements for low income 
households73.  
Another approach is to ensure that regulation and market design 
choices properly remunerate the value low-income households might 
provide to the heat and electricity system in terms of flexibility. Low-
income households might prefer to subscribe to lower heat and 
electricity tariffs, in return for accepting a slightly lower degree of 
supply security. In current schemes, there is however the risk that the 
value of these load-shaving services might be captured by the 
suppliers or other intermediaries. Hence, regulation should ensure 
that suppliers have to return the full value of such flexibility to 
households, and not just the small amount at which a sufficient 
number of low-income households are indifferent between a flexible 
and an inflexible scheme. It is the role of policymakers and regulators 
to provide consumers with some degree of market power in this newly 
developing market segment.  
  
                                               
73 Several corresponding programmes are discussed at https://epatee.eu/case-
studies, but typically the distributional impacts are not evaluated. 
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6  CONCLUSION 
In order to avoid potentially disastrous consequences from climate 
change, greenhouse gas emissions need to be reduced drastically in 
the coming decades. To achieve this objective, a suite of intrusive 
polices is needed, most notably putting a meaningful price on 
emissions but also fostering public support for the deployment of low-
carbon technologies and bans on inefficient technologies. These and 
other climate policies can have substantial distributional side effects. 
Such distributional effects will depend on the targeted 
sectors/products, the specific economic circumstances of each 
country and the policy design. 
While several ‘pure’ climate policies can be regressive, the costs and 
impacts of climate change are also likely to fall disproportionately on 
low-income households. Furthermore, many adverse distributional 
effects of climate policies can be avoided by appropriate policy design 
or remedied by using fiscal revenues linked to these policies to 
compensate low-income households. 
Based on our analysis we make five recommendations: 
1) Invest more in research 
Overall, we find that – despite excellent work on individual 
instruments – the issue of the distributional effects of climate policies 
has been under-explored in research and policymaking. In particular, 
the large-scale modelling exercises that underpin many long-term 
climate strategies do not address this issue. Thus, we recommend 
investing more in collecting data and researching this issue. Including 
different household types with different consumption patterns, capital 
stocks and discount rates into the models could provide valuable 
insights into this complex question. This can ultimately enable 
policymakers to make better choices in terms of designing a suite of 
climate policies that is simultaneously effective in mitigating 
emissions, efficient in minimising overall costs, and socially just. 
2) Making policies less regressive 
We already know that decarbonising certain sectors, such as aviation, 
has less adverse distributional effects, that certain policies are less 
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regressive than others (eg taxes compared to standards) and that 
certain design elements make policies less regressive (eg auctioning 
emissions permits instead of grandfathering them to polluters). 
Policymakers should factor such distributional consequences more 
prominently into their policy choices.   
3) Actively develop climate policies that benefit low-income 
households 
There are climate polices – such as support for energy-efficiency 
investment targeted at low-income households – that can bring 
benefits to low-income households. Policymakers should become 
more creative in developing such measures, not least to increase 
public acceptance of climate policies. 
Furthermore, countries that conduct active climate policies can seek 
to accommodate low-carbon technology sectors. This should include 
policies to facilitate the reallocation of workers and avoid skill 
shortages: priority should be given to improving science, technology, 
engineering and maths skills, while retraining the workforce, 
especially in the construction sector. 
4) Compensation is feasible – but needs to be done 
To achieve their ambitious decarbonisation targets, developed 
countries will have to resort to regressive carbon taxes on basic 
needs (eg heating fuel) to some degree. But recycling the revenues 
from such schemes – for example, through lump-sum transfers – will 
allow distributional concerns to be mitigated to a great extent, and 
should be forcefully implemented. 
5) An international approach can make domestic climate 
policies fairer 
Policymakers should continue to fight for a globally synchronised 
decarbonisation effort. This will create space for less-regressive 
national policies by assuaging the competitiveness concerns of 
domestic industry, which currently excuse instruments that benefit 
high-income households at the cost of low-income households. 
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ANNEX 
Table A: Categories used for summary table in section 2.2 
Category 
name in 
our report 
Category name 
in Eurostat 
(which sourced 
from EEA) 
Italian National Institute 
of Statistics category 
name 
Engel curve slope 
category name in 
Fajgelbaum and 
Khandelwal (2016) 
Air 
transport 
Fuel combustion 
in domestic 
aviation + 
International 
aviation 
Passenger transport by 
air Air transport 
Road fuel Fuel combustion in cars 
Fuels and lubricants for 
personal transport 
equipment 
Inland transport 
Agriculture Agriculture Food Food, beverages, and tobacco 
Electricity Fuel combustion 
in public electricity 
and heat 
production 
Electricity Electricity, gas, and water supply 
Heating Heat energy + Liquid fuels + Solid fuels + Gas - 
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Table B: Name of the food items used in the analysis in the 
various data sources 
Name in the 
analysis 
Name in the Family Food 
2016/17 survey of the 
Government of the 
United Kingdom (2018) Name in FAOSTAT 
Name in 
Hamerschlag 
and Venkat 
(2011) 
Rice Rice Rice, paddy - 
Beef and 
veal Beef and veal Meat, cattle - 
Milk 
Liquid wholemilk 
Milk, whole fresh 
cow - 
Chicken Chicken, uncooked - whole 
chicken or chicken pieces 
+ Other poultry, uncooked 
(including frozen) + 
Chicken and turkey, 
cooked Meat, chicken - 
Eggs Eggs Eggs, hen, in shell - 
Natural 
cheese Natural cheese - Natural cheese 
Lamb 
Mutton and lamb - Lamb 
Salmon Salmon, fresh, chilled or 
frozen - Salmon 
Pork 
Pork + Bacon and ham, 
uncooked + Bacon and 
ham, cooked  Meat, pig - 
Fruits and 
vegetables 
Fresh and processed fruit 
and vegetables, including 
potatoes - - 
Source: Bruegel. 
  
109 
 
Table C: Food item categories sourced from UN Comtrade 
Name in the 
analysis 
Code on UN 
Comtrade 
 Name in the 
analysis 
Code on UN 
Comtrade 
Beef and veal 
 
20110  
Fruits and 
vegetables 
701 
20120  702 
20210  703 
20220  704 
Pork 
 
20311  705 
20312  706 
20319  707 
20321  708 
20322  709 
20329  710 
Lamb 
20410  711 
20421  712 
20422  713 
20423  714 
20430  801 
20441  802 
20442  803 
20443  804 
Chicken 
20711  805 
20712  806 
20713  807 
20714  808 
20732  809 
20733  810 
20735  811 
20736  812 
Salmon 
30212  813 
30311  814 
30319    
30322    
30541    
Milk 40120    40130    
Natural cheese 
40610    
40620    
40640    
40690    
Eggs 40700    
Rice 100610    
 Source: UN Comtrade. 
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